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Abstract  
 
The connections between natural hazards, natural disasters and human vulnerabilities have become 
common features of disaster risk reduction (DRR) programmes since the adoption of The Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015. A series of international initiatives have begun to prioritize 
social vulnerability and community managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) in order to enhance the 
capacity of disaster-affected communities to recover from a disaster with little or no external 
assistance.  
This thesis explores whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to 
promote resilient communities through Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR) 
programmes, and to see if such programmes can generate sustainable development. The thesis 
investigates what the underlying vulnerabilities are, through the Pressure and Release (PAR) model, 
whilst also taking into account the particular historical and political context in Haiti. Vulnerability is 
evaluated in the three levels: root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions on the social side. 
The component on the natural side is the 2010 earthquake itself. The CMDRR process are analysed by 
applying Cordaid’s (2009) four components of DRR: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: 
developing contingency and development plans; 3) self-organization; and 4) participatory monitoring, 
evaluation and learning system. I also address the relationship between International non-
governmental organization (INGOs) and the community members in general, and the relationship 
between CARE and the community members in particular. 
The research draws on qualitative data, mainly from in-depth interviews, focus group discussions 
(FGDs) and participant observation of the CMDRR process. My findings suggest that people can 
possess characteristics that make them both vulnerable and resilient. The CMDRR process made the 
community members resilient in the sense that it had increased their awareness and knowledge 
capacity in regards to natural disasters, disaster-resilient construction and climate change. The 
women in La Grenada also felt empowered after the CMDRR process, and used their knowledge to 
educate the wider community. The CMDRR workshops had strengthened community ties, both within 
the community and with neighbouring communities. Despite human progress, the opportunities 
brought through the CMDRR process is not able to contribute to the long-term prosperity. Consistent 
with the PAR model and the numerous vulnerabilities identified, my findings suggests that resilience 
building is about good governance: it is primarily and fundamentally political, with its success 
depending on citizen power, genuine participation and a good relationship between the INGOs, the 
Haitian population and the government. As such, building resilient communities involves something 
more from simply dealing with preparedness measures through CMDRR interventions. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The context  
The escalation of severe disaster events triggered by natural hazards such as earthquakes, droughts, 
floods, storms and tropical cyclones, wild land fires, and volcanic eruptions have caused major loss of 
human lives and livelihoods, the destruction of economic and social infrastructure, as well as 
environmental damages (UNISDR, 2002).  Kofi Annan emphasizes that natural hazard events by 
themselves do not cause disasters, but that it must be seen in relation to an exposed, vulnerable and 
ill-prepared population that exacerbates the effects of disasters (ISDR, 2008 and UN/ISDR, 2002). 
IFRC defines natural disasters as “sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of 
a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that 
exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources” (Manyena, 2009 and 
IFRC in Kumar, 2011:2). Vulnerability is a concept that focuses on “limitation or lack of access to 
resources” (Bradshaw, 2004:10).  
As natural disasters are increasingly posing a substantive threat to both sustainable development and 
poverty-reduction initiatives, the need to reduce disaster risks and social vulnerabilities have 
increasingly become more urgent than ever before (UNISDR, 2002). For that reason, a series of 
international initiatives have begun to prioritize social vulnerability and community managed disaster 
risk reduction (CMDRR) in order to enhance the capacity of disaster-affected communities to recover 
from a disaster with little or no external assistance (GTZ, 2002, and Cordaid 2009). CMDRR places the 
communities at the heart of decision-making processes and in the management of disaster risk 
reduction measures (Cordaid, 2013). The ultimate goal of CMDRR interventions is to build resilient 
communities. 
In this context, Haiti is a particular interesting country to examine. Haiti has endured political 
instability, frequent regime shifts, and chronic challenges in governance since colonial times. The 
decades of neglect has not only lead to a lack of faith in the political system, but has also left the 
Haitian people in extreme poverty with 80 per cent of the population living under the poverty line 
and 54 per cent in severe poverty (Webersik and Klose, 2010, and CIA, 2014). In effect, the Haitian 
people have learned to look to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than the government 
for provision of essential services (USIP, 2010 and Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Haiti is also situated in the 
middle of a hurricane belt and the land is bounded by major faults and changes in topographic and 
geographic structure, creating an unsolid bedrock that increases the risk of storms and earthquakes 
(Iris, 2010). In addition, Haiti lacks absorptive capacity to buffer impacts of natural hazards due to 
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extreme deforestation, making the country more prone to natural disasters (Eichler, 2006). On 12th of 
January, 2010 a 7.0-magnitude earthquake further caused destruction to this vulnerable population 
as more than 200,000 people were killed. The disaster further resulted in immense humanitarian 
crisis, highlighting long-lasting development challenges (ALNAP, 2010). 
1.2 Main Objective and Research Questions 
This study is directly focused on the rebuilding situation in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, more 
specifically on the CMDRR programme implemented by CARE. CARE is an international non-
governmental organization (INGO). When referring to INGOs in this paper, I mean those NGOs that 
are global in reach, and operate in a range of different countries. The fact that they are 
“international” does not imply that the staffs are “international”, it simply refers to the organisation 
being a part of a larger international entity legally as well as financially (Ghimire, 2003). I also refer to 
local NGOs in this paper. By local NGOs, I mean formal organisations of people who are engaged in 
local activities that are not primarily for their own benefit (Ghimire, 2003). The overall term NGOs 
will be applied when I am referring to both INGOs and local NGOs.  
Although the major catastrophe of the 2010 earthquake is the catalyst for this research, I also 
recognize that Haiti is susceptible to multiple natural hazards such as storms and floods, in addition 
to earthquakes. The scope of this study was limited to Carrefour district and the two 
(neighbourhood) communities: Ti-Sous and La Grenade. I chose this district because it was severely 
damaged in the 2010 earthquake. However, as a mean of gaining a greater understanding of the 
complexities regarding the CMDRR process, and to understand the broader picture of INGO 
interventions a set of key informants outside of the CARE organization and the two neighbourhoods 
were also identified and interviewed. This way, I was able to present a more objective and critical 
analysis of my case, in addition to strengthening the credibility of my findings. They included Project 
Haiti; operating in Delmas and PLAN Haiti; operating in Croix-des-Bouquets. 
The main objective of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the 
capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes and to see if 
such programmes can generate sustainable development. The case study from Carrefour district was 
engaged in answering these research questions: 
1. What are the root causes of people’s vulnerability within the two neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous 
and La Grenade in Carrefour district, as perceived by the community members and the CARE 
staff before and after the 2010 earthquake? 
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2. What types of community knowledge and local structures existed in regard to disaster 
preparedness in these two communities prior to CARE’s operation?  
3. How has CARE, responsible for preparing the CMDRR programme and training, addressed the 
needs of the community members and what processes of empowerment is traceable to the 
local participation in the CMDRR programme after the 2010 earthquake? 
4. How does the people living in the two neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous and La Grenade, in Carrefour 
district, perceive INGOs in general, and CARE in particular, when it comes to rebuilding the 
two communities? 
 
The starting point of this investigation was to identify and analyse the underlying vulnerabilities that 
both caused the disaster following the 2010 earthquake, and that continued to challenge the 
community members living in Carrefour district. In this investigation, the PAR model of Ben Wisner, 
Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis (2003) was used as a simple tool for assessing people’s 
vulnerability to earthquakes, whilst also taking into account the particular historical and political 
context in Haiti. Vulnerability was evaluated in the three levels: root causes, dynamic pressure and 
unsafe conditions on the social side. The component on the natural side was the earthquake itself. 
My findings demonstrated that the community members had a high level of awareness on 
vulnerability, and that both CARE and the community members had a clear understanding of the 
social, political, economic and environmental factors that increased risks and vulnerabilities in 
Carrefour district. In the case of Carrefour district, reducing vulnerability was essentially about 
dealing with the issue of poverty, the lack of resources and the lack of employment opportunities, 
and to overcome the public-private divide that existed between the government and the community 
members. 
Next, I focused on the CMDRR process, implemented by CARE. In order to evaluate if such 
programmes could contribute to sustainable development I found it necessary to address the general 
relationship between CARE and the community members. I also addressed how the community 
members perceived INGOs in general. The perception of INGOs and local NGOs as actors before and 
after the 2010 earthquake were widely contested amongst my respondents. Most of my respondents 
saw INGOs as the only actors that could help make a difference, as the government was considered 
weak and corrupt. Local NGOs were considered as more corrupt and exploitive compared to INGOs. 
However, my findings also suggested that many viewed INGOs as profit motivated and as self-
interested actors. Some community members were also concerned about the overwhelming role 
played by INGOs in Haiti, and stressed the importance of a stronger civil society and a stronger 
government. Despite the previous perception my respondents had against local NGOs and INGOs, 
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there seemed to be an agreement that CARE had managed to include, rather that exclude, the 
community members in the CMDRR process. 
The CMDRR process was analysed by applying Cordaid’s (2009) four components of DRR: 1) risk 
assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: developing contingency and development plans; 3) self-
organization; and 4) participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system. Based on the 
evaluation of these four components and the outcomes of the CMDRR process, my findings 
suggested that resilience building went beyond CAREs capacity as it involved something more from 
simply dealing with preparedness measures. These findings are important because they enables a 
deeper understanding of the particular case in question and the cooperation between CARE and the 
community members in Carrefour district. It also allows us to suggest some analytical generalizations 
regarding how CMDRR functions in practice and provides greater insight into how the CMDRR 
process can strengthen local communities to decrease vulnerability and risks.  
1.3 Methodology in Brief  
My empirical research was based on qualitative methodology as I wanted to adopt a research 
strategy and a methodology that “answer the whys and how’s of human behaviour, opinion and 
experience” (Guest, Namely and Mitchell, 2013: 1). One goal was to understand what the 
participants really though, felt and did in vulnerable situations. Both primary and secondary data 
sources were collected over a one-month period, January 2015 to February 2015. The primary 
method of data collection was in-depth interviews and FGDs with community members and CARE 
staff. In addition, I was able to observe and participate in two workshops concerning CMDRR 
initiatives. I also reviewed a range of relevant documents, in particular evaluation reports from CARE. 
Lastly, I also used a self-completion questionnaire developed by CARE as a supplement to the 
qualitative data collection techniques in order to get clarification of some issues raised. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
This study is presented in eight (8) chapters. Chapter 1 presents an introduction that sets out the 
context of the study. It outlines the main purpose and focus of the research, and presents the main 
objective and research questions. It also present a brief introduction of the methodological approach 
applied for this study. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the national and historical context of Haiti, 
and the local context of Carrefour district. A particular focus was given on the presence of INGOs, as 
it was important to provide an understanding on the different ways they have shaped Haiti’s 
development path. The history reflects upon the mindset people have acquired over the many years 
of political instability and foreign exploitation. In addition, the government has repeatedly failed in 
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securing the economic and social security for its people, which may help explain the lack of trust 
people have had towards the state. Chapter 3 offers some clarification of key concepts relevant to 
this thesis, and present the framework for analysis, which forms the basis of my thesis. This is 
followed up by my methodology approach in Chapter 4, which describe and justify the main 
methodological approach applied for this study, including; choice of research strategy and research 
design, sampling, methods of data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations. In Chapter 5, 
all the organisations included in this case study are described. In Chapter 6, the key findings from my 
fieldwork in Haiti are presented, whereas the theory is brought into the analysis in chapter 7, 
followed by concluding remarks and reflections in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2 Study Area: Port au Prince, Haiti 
 
The main objective of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the 
capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes and to examine 
if such programmes can generate sustainable development. An important starting point for this 
examination is to get a better understanding of the particular context in which this relationship and 
development takes place. This chapter will therefore provide an overview of the key characteristics 
of Haiti in regards to the political, economic, social and environmental reality dating back to colonial 
times. There will be a focus on the main contributing factors to vulnerability, including internal 
factors such as political instability, economical challenges and social oppressions, and external 
factors, including environmental problems, foreign interests and development assistance. A 
particular focus has been given on the presence of INGOs, as it is important to provide an 
understanding of the different ways they have shaped Haiti’s development path. 
2.1 National Context 
The Land 
Haiti is located between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, and shares the island of 
Hispaniola with Dominican Republic (DR). Its terrain consist mainly of mountains interspersed with 
small coastal plains and river valleys (CIA, 2014).  
 
Figure 1: Map of Haiti (Source: CIA, 2014) 
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Social and economic indicators 
Based on UNDPs Human Development Report of 2014, Haiti’s Human Development Index (HDI) value 
for 2013 is 0.471, which is positioning the country at the low human development category of 168 
out of 187 countries and territories. Table 1 reviews Haiti’s progress in each of the HDI indicators, 
including the three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to 
knowledge and a decent standard of living.  Between 1980 and 2013 Haiti’s life expectancy at birth 
increased by 12.3 years, mean year of schooling increased by 3.5 years and expected years of 
schooling increased by 2.5 years. In Haiti the GGNI1 per capital decreased by about 36.5 per cent 
between 1980 and 2013 (UNDP, 2014). 
 Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Expected 
years of 
schooling 
Mean years 
of schooling 
GGNI per 
capital (2011 
PPP$) 
HDI value 
1980 50.8 5.1 1.4 2,576 0.352 
1985 52.6 6.5 2.2 2,345 0.392 
1990 54.5 7.0 2.7 2,209 0.413 
1995 56.1 7.1 3.3 1,569 0.414 
2000 57.5 7.3 3.9 1,660 0.433 
2005 59.3 7.4 4.5 1,574 0.447 
2010 61.9 7.6 4.9 1,494 0.462 
2011 62.3 7.6 4.9 1,561 0.466 
2012 62.7 7.6 4.9 1,636 0.471 
2013      
Figure 2: Haiti´s HDI trends based on consistent time series data and new goalposts (Source: UNDP, 2014, 
p.2) 
Haiti also has the highest levels of poverty in the Western Hemisphere, with 80 % of the population 
living below the poverty line and 54 % in severe poverty (Webersik et al, 2010, and CIA, 2014). This 
has generated an unemployment rate of about 70 per cent, low-income rates, weak government 
institutions, and lack of public infrastructure, all in which contributes to violence and related security 
                                                          
1 PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. GNI is 
the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the 
valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) 
from abroad. Source: The World Bank (2015): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD.  
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problems (Webersik et al, 2010, and ALNAP, 2010). Gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual 
exploitation against women and girls is exacerbated by poverty and poor security (PDNA, 2010).  
About two-fifths of all Haitians work in the agricultural sector, which consist mainly of small-scale 
subsistence farming. The country has experienced little formal job creation over the past decade, 
although informal economy is growing. According to the Central intelligence Agency (CIA, 2014), 
poverty, corruption, vulnerability to natural disasters, deforestation and low level of education for 
much of the population are among Haiti’s most serious impediments to foster economic growth.  
Another and maybe a more severe impediment that hinders economic growth is Haiti’s distribution 
of wealth. The country is the most unequal in the region where 1 percent of the population controls 
half of its wealth (Hallward, 2007). Haiti also suffers from a lack of investment, partly because of 
weak infrastructure. The government relies on formal international economic assistance for fiscal 
sustainability, where over half of its annual budget coming from outside sources (CIA, 2014). The 
country is also heavily aid-dependent with 70 % of the state budget coming from external financing 
in 2010 (Zanotti, 2010). Social services such as health and education are often provided by INGOs and 
according to The North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) no other country in the world 
has as many NGOs per capita as Haiti, with an estimated 10 000 being present previous to the 2010 
earthquake (World Bank, 2014 and Edmonds, 2014). 
Another contributing factor to Haiti’s vulnerability is its increased population growth that has forced 
many people to settle down in hazard prone areas, including Port-Au-Prince (Webersik et al, 2010). 
The land and environmental issues 
The poorest country of the Americas is also the one that is most disaster prone, especially to 
disasters such as floods, landslides, storms, hurricanes, tsunamis and earthquakes (ALNAP, 2010).  
The figures below provide the data related to human and economic losses from disasters that have 
occurred between 1980 and 2010. Based on the numbers it becomes evident that most of Haiti’s 
suffering can be directly attributed to major storms and flooding. However, the 2010 earthquake is at 
the top of the list of disasters in terms of the number of people affected and killed, and the 
magnitude of economic losses.  
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Disasters  Date Affected 
Earthquake 2010 3,700,000 
Storm 1994 1,587,000 
Storm 1980 1,167,000 
Drought 1992 1,000,000 
Storm 1988 870.000 
Storm 2004 315,594 
Flood 2003 150,000 
Storm 2008 125,050 
Storm 2007 108,763 
Drought 1980 103,000 
Figure 3: Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (People Affected) (Source: Herard, 2011:3-4) 
 
Disaster Date Killed 
Earthquake 2010 222,570 
Epidemic 2010 2,761 
Storm 2004 2,754 
Flood 2004 2,665 
Storm 1994 1,122 
Storm 2008 529 
Storm 1980 220 
Storm 1998 190 
Storm 2007 90 
Storm 2008 85 
Figure 4: Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (People killed) (Source: Herard, 2011:.3-4) 
  
   
 
10 
 Building Resilient Communities through Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes 
 
Disaster Date Cost (US$ x 1,000) 
Earthquake 2010 8,000,000 
Storm 1980 400,000 
Storm 1998 180,000 
Storm 1988 91,286 
Storm 2004 50,000 
Storm 2005 50,000 
Storm 1994 50,000 
Flood 2002 1,000 
Storm 2004 1,000 
Storm 2005 500 
Figure 5: Top Ten Natural Disasters Reported (Economic Damages) (Source: Herard, 2011:.3-4) 
 
Haiti’s vulnerability to seismic activity  
Haiti’s geographic location makes it highly vulnerable to seismic activity. Haiti is part of the Caribbean 
Plate, which is, as explained by Interim Risk Management Plan (Iris) (2010), a section of the earth’s 
crust that is bounded by major faults and changes in geological structure. Within these plates, there 
have been detected two major faults of concern for earthquake risk. The first is the Enriquillo fault, 
which crosses the southern peninsula from east to west, and the second is the Septentrional Fault, 
which runs east to west along the northern coast of Haiti. Both of these faults have generated 
earthquakes over the centuries (Iris, 2010, p 8). However, as the country had not faced an 
earthquake in over two centuries, Haitians never saw earthquakes as a threat. Thus, little was 
invested in establishing a system to monitor seismic activity before the 2010 earthquake. After the 
2010 earthquake there has been developed eight seismic stations in order to improve the 
understanding of seismic risk and thus enhance the national resiliency (Herard, 2011).   
On a smaller scale, topography is also directly linked to earthquake vulnerability in Haiti. Haiti has 
three layers of geology:  The bottom layer, Jurassic/Cretaceous, consists of old metamorphic rocks 
that form the backbone and basement of the island. Variable layers of more recent and loose 
sediments such as limestone follow these rocks, creating an unsolid bedrock, and thus, increase the 
risk of earthquakes (Iris, 2010).   
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Climate change 
With regards to climate change, Haiti ranks fourth out of 200 nations on the Climate Change 
Vulnerability Index created by Maplecroft-a risk management firm- in 2013 (Maplecroft, 2013). This 
evaluation is based on three factors. The first factor is the exposure to extreme climate-related 
events, including sea level rise and future changes in temperature, precipitation and specific 
humidity. The second factor is the sensitivity of populations, in terms of health, education, 
agricultural dependence and available infrastructure. The third factor is the adaptive capacity of 
countries to combat the impacts of climate change, which encompasses amongst other economic 
factors, resource security and the effectiveness of government (Maplecroft, 2013). 
In addition, scientists have noted significant increase in the wind speeds and precipitation intensities 
of Atlantic hurricanes over the past decades as a result of rising ocean temperatures. As climate 
change is accepted to be a real treat, it is predicted more destructive storms in the future (Herard, 
2011). Haiti’s environment is also extremely degraded, where for instance clearing trees to make 
charcoal, the main fuel in the country, is a way of surviving in extreme poverty. Thus, Haiti also lacks 
absorptive capacity to buffer impacts of natural hazards making the country more prone to natural 
hazards and climate change (Eichler, 2006).  
2.2 Local Context: Carrefour district 
There is little information online about the specific neighbourhoods, in which I conducted my main 
research, the information provided below is based on interviews with CARE officers, and the facts 
given are taken from a CARE’s project website.  
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Figure 6: Map of Carrefour district (Source: Weather-forecast, 2015) 
My study was conducted in Carrefour district in the South-West part of Port au Prince. More specific, 
I carried out my research in Ti-Sous and Grenada, which are a part of the four neighbourhoods-
including Aztek and Sapodilla-in the 11th section in Carrefour. These four communities are situated 
in a very poor area, where the population are highly vulnerable to risks and natural hazards. 
Carrefour district was particularly affected by the earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 as it was 
situated near the earthquake’s epicentre. In these four quarters, 3,687 homes were identified as 
severely damaged or beyond repair. In addition, 2,416 people still lived in camps (Akvorsr, 2015). 
Today, the access to basic services are very limited, the economic sector is small, the unemployment 
rate is high, and there are not enough houses to hold the increasing population, which in turn makes 
it difficult for families to return from the camps to the area in which they came from (Akvorsr, 2015). 
In addition, these neighbourhoods are extremely vulnerable in the rainy season as the canals, which 
were built to evacuate the excess water and hinder flooding from occurring, are filled with garbage, 
pigs and goats. As such, the lack of a sustainable trash collection system makes the area vulnerable 
to floods and landslides (Akvorsr, 2015).  
2.3 Historical context 
In order to understand the current challenges in Haiti and why development efforts has fallen short 
in rebuilding the country after the 2010 earthquake, it is important to shed light on some of the main 
historical events.  
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Conquest, slavery and resistance 
In 1942, Christopher Columbus landed on the northern coast of what he then called island 
Hispaniola. The island became the first European settlement and the starting point for European 
conquest in the Americans. By the middle of the sixteenth century, Hispaniola’s indigenous 
populations of perhaps 500 000 to 750 000 people were almost eliminated through war, slavery and 
diseases. Hispaniola remained a Spanish colony for more than two hundred years, until the French 
settlers from the famous pirate haven of Tortuga, an island north of Hispaniola, moved in on Spanish 
territory and took control of its western half in 1697 (Dubois, 2012).  
The French renamed it Saint-Dominguez. The territory became one of the key point of the “triangle 
trade”, in which created the Atlantic economy of the eighteenth century: manufactured goods were 
shipped from Europe to Africa, slaves were brought from the central African region to the Americas, 
and slave produced crops, including sugar, cotton and coffee were sent from the Caribbean back to 
Europe. The slaves worked under harsh conditions within a well-ordered system referred by Sidney 
Mintz (in Dubois, 2012) as a combination of “field and factory”. This system brought advanced 
technology and carefully designed labour management, ultimately making Hispaniola the most 
profitable colony in the world by the late eighteenth century. However, despite the economic 
growth, the effective system of labour also exhausted the soil through one cane harvest after 
another, and began the process of deforestation (Dubois, 2012).  
 An official estimate of the colony’s population in 1789 reported that Saint-Domingue contained 
55 000 free people, both white people and coloured people, and 450 000 slaves. The free coloured 
made up a larger portion of the local police, where the main task was to protect the territory from its 
potentially overwhelming enemy within the “slave majority”.  The French managed to control Saint-
Domingue until August 1791, when a large rebellion spread throughout the colony. Toussaint 
L`Overture emerged as its leader and slavery was officially abolished in 1793 (Dubois, 2012). 
The Post-Revolutionary period 
After securing its independence on January the 1st  1804, Jean- Jacques Dessalines renamed the 
nation Haiti and proclaimed a new independent nation, making it the first independent black republic 
in the world and the second independent republic in the Western hemisphere. However, as with 
many successful revolutions, victory was followed by drawbacks, civil unrest and war (Flood, 2010 
and Dubois, 2012). 
There have been 32 coups, most arising from the ruling class and the various foreign business groups. 
Apart from these, Haiti was not to be recognized as an independent state by France until 1825, after 
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Haiti managed-with the help of the US- to repay 150 million French franc for “lost profits” from the 
slave trade. In effect, Haiti was paying twice for its freedom; first with blood, and second with 
money. The money borrowed was still being repaid by Haiti as late as 1947 (Flood, 2010).  
Spain and France were not the only countries that took control over Haiti. In 1915, a contingent of US 
Marines landed in Haiti, launching a 20-year long occupation, during which time they killed, officially, 
over 3000 Haitians who resisted US occupation. The US occupation also imposed a new constitution 
in which foreign companies were allowed to own land. In effect, the new constitution generated 
good opportunities for American investments. In fact, these advantages for US corporations grew so 
that the 13 companies operating in 1966 had become 154 by 1981, accounting for more than 40 per 
cent of Haitian exports (Flood, 2010).  
The father-son Duvalier dictatorship 
For nearly thirty years, the father-and-son Duvalier dictatorship increased Haiti’s external debt and 
continued its underdevelopment. By 1957, Haiti’s economy, infrastructure, and political institutions 
were ineffective.  Duvalier’s initial targets were the army and the labour unions, however, this latter 
were crushed quickly. Duvalier soon replaced and diminished the power of the army with his own 
private security group, known as The Tonton Macoutes. At Duvalier’s command the army of 300 000 
terrorised and intimidated the citizens, and by 1964, Duvalier had effectively eliminated any 
meaningful oppositions within Haiti (Ferguson, 1987).  By the time Duvalier died in 1971, state-
sanctioned terrorism had killed an estimated 30 000 to 60 000 Haitian citizens. Before his death, 
Papa Doc appointed his son, Jean Claude Duvalier, who took over the presidency in 1971 at the age 
of 19. Jean Claude Duvalier, also known as Baby doc, continued his father’s work (Schuller, 2006). 
The UN held a favourable view of the Duvalier’s reign, and the country garnered significant foreign 
aid during these two presidential periods. The amount of aid was staggering: between 1972 to 1981 
alone it amounted to US $584 million, with 80 percent of that coming from the US (Dubois, 2012). 
Despite aid assistance, large-scale corruption meant that this money never reached the Haitian 
people. On December 5, 1980, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave “Baby Doc” US $22 
million in aid. James Ferguson (in Schuller, 2006: 2-3) notes that: 
Within weeks, $20 million of this amount had been withdrawn from the Haitian government’s 
account; of this, the IMF stated, $4 million had gone directly to the VSN [the tontons macoutes, a 
paramilitary organization responsible for as many as  30,000 killings in the Duvalier period], while the 
remaining $16 million had seemingly disappeared into Duvalier’s various personal accounts. An IMF 
report concluded almost euphemistically that its analysts “attributed excessive unbudgeted spending 
as the most important cause of Haiti’s financial crises” (Schuller, 2006: 2-3). 
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Mark Schuller (2006) highlights two basic reasons for why so much foreign money were poured into 
the Duvalier dictatorship. The first reason was geopolitical, as US feared that Haiti would follow 
Cuba’s example and turn to communism during the Cold War. Baby Doc made it clear that his loyalty 
to the US was for sale, and got the money he asked for. He repeated this performance and got more 
aid when the US wanted to block Cuba’s entry into the Organization of American States in 1962 
(Schuller, 2006: 3). The second reason for the inflow of aid to Haiti was, according to Schuller (2006), 
economic. In the early 1970s, unstable oil prices caused a financial shock. In addition, President 
Nixon removed the dollar from the gold standard, causing extreme fluctuations in its value. As 
wealthy investors needed to spend their liquid assets, they poured money into international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank (WB). The investors convinced the WB to increase its lending 
profiles to governments in the Global South, which they did. Initially, these loans were given at a low 
interest rate, but President Reagan responded to the inflation crisis differently and increased the 
interest rate in 1982. After adjusting for inflation, interest rates were -3.4% in 1970, but shot up to 
27.5% in 1982 for the same loans (Schuller, 2010). 
In early 1986, a protest was initiated in the city of Gonaives, which grew into a series of revolts 
throughout the Haitian countryside. Within a matter of days, the revolt had intensified and reached 
Port au Prince. Jean Claude Duvalier and his family were forced into exile, leaving behind a country 
that in 1985 was the poorest country in the western hemisphere (Ferguson, 1987).  
The republic of NGOs 
Despite the fact that the global community were aware of the corruptive regime of the Duvaliers, aid 
money continued to pour into the country. However, the donor countries found an elegant solution, 
namely, channelling more and more of their aid into what were then called private voluntary 
organizations (PVOs), which now largely go under the name of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs). In this way, the money given bypassed the government while still promoting stability, 
decreasing poverty and developing a better health care and educational system. It did not take long 
for Haiti to become a magnet for evangelical religious groups and secular relief agencies alike. By 
1984 there were at least four hundred PVOs operating in the country, and soon a new aid group was 
arriving Haiti every day. In time, this period has become to be known as the “Republic of NGOs” 
(Dubois, 2012). 
Neoliberalism   
After the brutal regime of the Duvaliers, Haiti began its second shot at independence broke and 
isolated. In desperate need for money, the ruling military junta entered into negotiation with the IMF 
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for development loans. As access to credit was dependent on the reduction of tariffs and the 
privatization of the remaining state industry, public funding decreased substantially. Five different 
governments marked the period between 1986 and 1990, each attempting to gain the favour of the 
international community by implementing neoliberal policies (Dubois, 2012). Neoliberalism can be 
understood as economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can be best advanced by 
liberal individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within a free market (Lewis et al, 2009: 5). By 
the time of the 1990 election, the IMF and the WB wanted more control. With the democratic 
election of a populist priest named Jean Bertrand Aristide in Haiti’s first ever free and fair elections in 
1990, the Haitian people voted overwhelmingly against neoliberalism and the USA candidate; the 
former WB staffer Marc Bazin (Edmonds, 2012). However, less than eight months after Aristides 
inauguration, he was taken hostage in a military coup. Aristide managed to escape to the US while 
the army carried out brutal reprisals against his supporters, killing over twelve hundred over the 
following days, and even more people were killed in the two years of military rule. During this period, 
the economic situation in Haiti worsened as an embargo put in place after the military coup had 
taken a deep economic toll. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 20 per cent, and 
unemployment rose to 75 per cent between 1992 and 1993, as the textile and assembly plants - 
which constituted over three-quarters of Haiti’s exports - were closed, the tax collection system 
collapsed, and infrastructure crumbled (Ramachandran and Walz, 2012). Americas Watch and The 
National coalition for Haitian Refugees (1993: 1) argued that the military forces that overthrew Mr 
Aristide also supressed Haiti´s once diverse and vibrant civil society with acts of killings, arrests, 
intimidations and beatings. 
Aristide returned to presidency in 1994 with the help of the US under Bill Clinton. As a condition of 
their support, international financial institutions insisted that Aristide should follow the neoliberal 
economic doctrine and remove all protectionist tariffs. Even though Aristide attempted to resist, he 
found himself facing the threat of withheld aid and loans. This policy, as Clinton himself would later 
admit, devastated Haiti’s rice growers and deepened the country’s dependency on imported food. In 
addition, this generated a massive exodus of farmers to urban centres (Edmonds, 2012). Once back 
in office, Aristide disbands the murderous Haitian army. Foreign troops from the US and later from a 
UN mission took over some of the army’s duties, which set the foundation for a long-term foreign 
military presence in the country (Dubois, 2012 and Edmonds 2012).  
Several years later, Aristide was again elected President, with 92 per cent of the votes. However, the 
turnout was low due to an opposition boycott of the elections. The US used this as an excuse to cut 
off much needed aid. This economic situation led to many disgruntled government workers, unpaid 
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teachers, and poorly supplied hospitals. In this period, NGOs began, yet again, to spring up all over 
the country, creating a parallel NGO state in Haiti (Dubois, 2012 and Edmonds 2012).  
In spite of the aid embargo, under the two Aristide administrations, more schools were built in Haiti 
than during the period of 1804-1990. Aristide and his Lavalas party also began a universal schooling 
program and the country’s first free public medical school with the assistance from the Taiwanese 
and Cuban governments. It was estimated that the schools would produce over 600 doctors during 
its first 12 years of existence. However, when the coup occurred three weeks later, the schools were 
shut down and turned into barracks for the US Marines.  Despite modest progress, Aristide was being 
viewed as a threat to the Haitian elite and American hegemony. On 29th of February 2004, he was 
overthrown once again and exiled to the Central African Republic (Edmond, 2012). 
The UN stabilization mission: MINUSTAH 
After Aristides departure, Boniface Alexandre, President of the Supreme Court, was inaugurated as 
interim President in accordance with the Haitian Constitution. He immediately requested 
international assistance as the political situation had failed to stabilize. Responding to this emerging 
humanitarian crisis, UN authorized a multi-national interim force with the UN stabilization Mission in 
Haiti, known as the MINUSTAH. This mission was dispatched to provide a secure and stable 
environment that in turn could support a peaceful and lasting political state (Better World Campaign, 
2014). Since their arrival, however, Haiti has experienced human rights violations under the banner 
of stabilization, where MINUSTAH’s has been implicated in numerous crimes, including sexual 
exploitation of minors, prostitution and rape (Guzman, 2015). During this period, MINUSTAH and the 
government struggled to restore law and order, particularly between illegal armed gangs and the 
police. These challenges followed under the Rene Préval administration in the period between 2006 
until 2011. Even though the new administration faced numerous challenges, including the need to 
reign in endemic crime and gang violence, restore public services, and foster economic growth and 
poverty reduction, Préval managed to establish relative internal stability and a period of economic 
growth (Taft-Morales, 2013). 
Natural disasters halt a period of political and economic progress  
During the period of relative political and economic stability, Haiti experienced a series of tropical 
storms, which killed more than 800 people and leaving more than 1 million people homeless or in 
need of aid (ALNAP, 2010). In addition, a worsening food crisis emerged that led to violent protests 
and the removal of Haiti’s prime minister in 2008. This further complicated the governability. 
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Without a prime minister, Haiti could not sign certain agreements with foreign donors or implement 
programs to address this crisis for over four months (Taft-Morales, 2013). 
However, it was the earthquake that hit the island in January 2010 that really left the country in ruin. 
The earthquake resulted in more than 200,000 deaths and destroyed over 80% of the capital Port-
Au-Prince (ALNAP, 2010).  Political stability was especially uncertain after the disaster as 17 per cent 
of the country’s civil servants were killed, and the presidential palace, the parliament building and 28 
of 29 ministry buildings were destroyed. Michel Martelly, a popular musician without any previous 
political experience, was sworn into office as president on May 14, 2011 (Taft-Morales, 2013).  
President Martelly administration and current challenges 
The country’s tumultuous political history continues to challenge President Martelly. According to 
the Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated (2012), the President needs to overcome six 
principal challenges in order to carry out sustainable development.  
The first obstacle was to find and keep a Prime Minister that could manage the President’s policies. 
During Martelly’s first year in office, Haiti was without a prime minister, which limited the 
government’s ability to act and the international community to move forward with reconstruction 
effort after the earthquake. It also took five months to form a government because of a dispute with 
the opposition party (Taft-Morales, 2013). On January the 17th, 2015, Martelly had to announce a 
new prime minister again, in order to defuse a crisis over long-delayed election. The announcement 
of Evans Paul as Prime minister followed the one-month earlier resignation of Laurent Lamothe 
(Capital News, 2015.) 
The second challenge was to relocate the 390,000 Haitians that continued to live in the 701 tent 
camps around Port au Prince to permanent shelters. This has however proven difficult because of a 
substantial decrease in aid money  
The third challenge was to contain a cholera epidemic that has been going on since October 
2010.However as noted; the Haitian government has received only a fraction of requested aid 
money, which has forced numerous NGOs to cease the operations of health stations (Virtual Defence 
and Development, Incorporated, 2012). 
The fourth challenge was to demobilize the 10,000-member MINUSTHA force with the belief that the 
Haitian Armed Forced is better to secure national sovereignty. However, some international 
organisations and donors are apprehensive about restoration of the Armed Forces as they claim that 
the resources should be devoted to improve the MINUSTHA. In addition, the Armed Forces claim that 
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the country does not face a significant foreign threat (Virtual Defence and Development, 
Incorporated, 2012).  
The fifth challenge was to attend to a desperate poor and unemployed population, and reducing 
crime and inequalities (Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012). 
The last challenge was the Mitigation of Volatile Political Loyalties. Haiti’s political system has since 
the Duvaliers been deeply entwined with political loyalties that has resulted in conflict and violence. 
In turn, this has fostered a lack of faith in the state-apparatus, weakening the already fragile state-
society synergy (Virtual Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012). 
In addition to these six challenges, the President and his government must also improve the working 
relationship with Parliament, in which only 3 out of 129 members belong to his party (Virtual 
Defence and Development, Incorporated, 2012).  
I also find it relevant to add a seventh challenge, namely the country’s vulnerability to natural 
hazards, which will continue to influence Haiti’s development. If history is any indication, the 
President will not have an easy time ruling the hemispheres poorest and most vulnerable country. 
2.4 Summary 
This overview of the political situation and history in Haiti illustrates some important elements that 
are of particular relevance to this thesis.  
Firstly, Haiti has endured political instability, frequent regime shifts, and chronic challenges in 
governance since colonial times. The decades of neglect has not only lead to a lack of faith in the 
political system, which threatens the effectiveness, fairness and growth of policies and social 
projects, but has also left the Haitian people in extreme poverty.  
In order to stay afloat Haiti has received massive influxes of aid, which leads to the second important 
element; foreign interests and humanitarian assistance. Throughout different periods, Haiti’s 
development has been dependent on external aid and assistance, mainly from the US (Dubois, 2012 
and Schuller, 2006). By looking at the historical context, it becomes evident that aid was often given 
either as a reward or as punitive measure to influence Haitian politics. The implementation of the 
neoliberal economic doctrine and removal of all protectionist tariffs in the 1990s provides a good 
example of this (Dubois, 2012). The dominant role of NGOs in Haiti has created a parallel state said to 
be more powerful than the government itself (USIP, 2010 and Lewis et.al. 2009). In effect, this means 
that the aid-dependency and limited capacity of the state has led to foreign donors increasingly 
stepping into the government’s shoes. Zanotti (2010) and Ramachandran et.al. (2012) argue that the 
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weakness of government institutions is largely due to the history of aid dependence and foreign 
interventions. The country is heavily aid-dependent with 70 % of the state budget coming from 
external financing (Zanotti, 2010). Most of the services such as health and education are therefore 
provided by INGOs or local NGOs (Zanotti, 2010 and World Bank, 2014). 
Thirdly, Haiti is situated in the middle of a hurricane belt and the land is bounded by major faults and 
changes in topographic and geographic structure, creating unsolid bedrock that increases the risk of 
storms and earthquakes (Iris, 2010). In addition, Haiti also lacks absorptive capacity to buffer impacts 
of natural hazards due to extreme deforestation, making the country more prone to natural disasters 
(Eichler, 2006). 
Lastly, if a country has experienced political instability over time, as Haiti has, the country is also 
more prone to natural disasters as this increase social vulnerability (Webersik et al, 2010).  
Based on the aforementioned factors, it can be argued that the current challenges in Haiti are a 
product of its history where political instability, weak institutions, environmental vulnerability, 
extreme poverty and inequalities continues to influence Haiti’s development. These factors have also 
had implications for how Haitian people understand democracy and accountability2 today. 
  
                                                          
2 Accountability can be understood as the procedures requiring officials and those who seek to influence them 
to follow established rules defining acceptable processes and outcomes, and to demonstrate that they have 
followed those procedures. Johnston, M. (n.d:2): Good Governance: Rule of Law, Transparency, and 
Accountability. Available at: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010193.pdf.  
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Chapter 3 Clarification of concepts and literature review   
 
The first part of this chapter offers some clarifications of key concepts relevant to this thesis, 
including; climate change, natural hazards, natural disasters, risk, vulnerability, sustainable 
development, resilience, and participation. Furthermore, it reviews some general literature on 
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) initiatives, with a particular focus on the CMDRR process, and the 
Pressure and Release (PAR) model. The second part provides background information on the 2010 
Haitian earthquake and the phases of the response and the recovery process, focusing on the actual 
role of the government, civil society and NGOs. In considering CARE’s potential as capacity building 
agents for the CMDRR process in Carrefour district, I also find it necessary to study their origin and 
nature as forms of social organization. The last part highlights the importance of INGOs in 
development, but also engages with the criticism that the increased profile of INGOs now attracts.  
Throughout this chapter, literature on Haiti will be referred to and included, when available. The 
chapter ends with a presentation of the framework for analysis, which forms the basis of my thesis 
3.1 Clarification of concepts 
3.1.1 Natural disasters and vulnerability 
 
When disasters happen, popular and media interpretations tend to focus on their naturalness, as in 
the phrase ‘natural hazards, including geophysical events such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, 
erosion, wildfires, tornadoes, and volcanic eruptions. Although their destructiveness are part of the 
natural system, it is an inadequate way of understanding the disasters that are associated with 
natural hazards (Wisner et al, 2003). As such, the term “natural disasters” which involve the 
interaction of natural hazards and social systems have emerged in the last thirty years (Johnson, 
2006).  IFRC defines natural disasters as “sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the 
functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental 
losses that exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources” (Manyena, 
2009 and IFRC in Kumar, 2011:2).  
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In his foreword to ‘‘Living with Risk,’’ the United Nations’ Secretary General, Koﬁ Annan 3 raised 
awareness to human-induced conditions that increase vulnerability to natural disasters: 
Communities will always face natural hazards, but today’s disasters are often generated by, or at 
least exacerbated by, human activities… At no time in human history have so many people lived in 
cities clustered around seismically active areas. Destitution and demographic pressure have led more 
people than ever before to live in ﬂood plains or in areas prone to landslides. Poor land-use planning; 
environmental management; and a lack of regulatory mechanisms both increase the risk and 
exacerbate the effects of disasters.  
Koﬁ Annan (quoted in UN/ISDR, 2002: 2). 
In this statement, Kofi Annan recognizes the difference between natural climate change and human 
induced climate change. Natural climate change is known to be related to changes in ocean currents, 
solar activity, volcanic eruptions and other natural factors not caused by human activities (non-
anthropogenic), whereas human induced climate change (anthropogenic) are when humans are 
causing climatic changes through fossil fuel burning, clearing forests and other practices that increase 
the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. The current concentration of GHG 
in the atmosphere is now the highest it has been for the past 500,000 years (ISDR, 2008). This 
situation is in line with the official definition by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) that climate change is the change that can be attributed “directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods” (ISDR, 2008: 1). 
Kofi Annan also emphasizes that hazard events by themselves do not cause disasters, but that it must 
be seen in relation to an exposed, vulnerable and ill-prepared population that exacerbates the 
effects of disasters (ISDR, 2008 and Annan, 2006:1). Similarly, Wisner et al (2003: 7) argue, “to 
understand disasters we must not only know about the types of hazards that might affect people, but 
also the different levels of vulnerability of different groups of people”. Vulnerability is a concept that 
focuses on “limitation or lack of access to resources” (Bradshaw, 2004:10). The converse of 
                                                          
3 Annan, K, (2002): Foreword to Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, (UN/ISDR). 
Quoted in UN/ISDR, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. (2002): Disaster Reduction 
and Sustainable Development Understanding the links between vulnerability and risk to disasters related to 
development and environment. Available at:  http://www.gdrc.org/uem/disasters/disenvi/DR-and-SD-
English.pdf.Accessed: 24.02.2015.  
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vulnerability is the capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from hazard impacts (DfID, 
2005). The current description of the nature of disasters is, thus, that they are “complex interactions 
of the natural and human world-encompassing both human, social, economic, political and 
environmental dimensions” (Wisner et al, 2003: 4).  
3.1.2 The distribution of risk within and between countries 
 
Risk4 is differentially distributed between and within societies, as some groups, people and countries 
are more prone to damages, loss and suffering in the context of various disasters. Risk is also 
captured by the term vulnerability, where typically social characteristics, including; class, occupation, 
caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, age, health status and the nature and extent of social networks, 
explains the variation of impact in relation to natural hazards. Other key factors that are highlighted 
in the literature are economic resources such as secure income, access to savings or credit, 
employment with social protection, marketable job skills, education and training, and control over 
productive resources (Bradshaw, 2004 and Enarson, 2000).   
Empirical evidence has shown that people living in developing countries are more exposed and 
vulnerable to effectively cope with disasters (Webersik, 2012). An estimated 97 per cent of natural 
disaster related deaths each year occur in developing countries, and the percentage of economic loss 
in relation to the GNP in developing countries far exceeds the ones in developed countries. This fact 
becomes even more relevant for small island developing states (SIDS) (UNISDR, 2002:3). Webersik 
(2012) illustrate this by comparing two similar cases: “the 2010 earthquake in Chile was stronger 
than the 2010 Haiti earthquake; the death toll in Haiti was almost 500 times larger” (Webersik, 
2012).  
There are several reasons for this. First, the geological location in developing countries is often 
exposed to extreme natural phenomenon. An explanation to this is that hydro meteorological, 
seismic, volcanic and other natural events are more frequent and severe in the subtropical and 
tropical regions of the South, and poses a permanent ongoing threat to the people living in these 
regions (GTZ, 2002).  
                                                          
4  Risk can be understood as the possibility of harmful consequences or expected losses resulting from 
interactions between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. It is ‘‘the combination of 
the probability of an event and its negative consequences’’. United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UN/ISDR) (2009):  UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction, UN/ISDR, Geneva. Pp. 25.  
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Second, there is a comparatively lower level of development, which is evident in the often fragile 
infrastructure, the poor building fabric of housing, the vulnerability of productive activities, the low 
level of political and social organization and the absence of warning systems (GTZ, 2002). In turn, this 
vulnerability creates a “downward spiral of deepening poverty and increasing risk” (Vathana, Oum, 
Kan, and Chervier, 2013). 
The third reason for the increased vulnerability is that the rapid rise in the world population has 
altered the distribution pattern of human settlements and land use. In developing countries the 
transition from a pre-modern or traditional society to a modern society goes on without the 
necessary safety precautions (e.g. when building bridges and houses), which increases the 
vulnerability to and risk of adverse impacts, resulting from a natural event (GTZ, 2002). Like other 
countries in the region, Haiti has experienced an uncontrolled increase in urban settlements. As in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Haiti is experiencing what is called “premature urbanization”, where the 
agricultural sector is not productive as it has long surpassed its capacity and at the same time, the 
urban areas are not generating economic growth. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan comprised in 
2007 one-fourth of Haiti’s entire population. As argued by USAID (2007:3): “ given the sheer scale of 
settlement in coastal flood plains, predicted deaths due to catastrophic flooding in Port-au-Prince 
would far surpass all other disasters in Haiti’s meteorological record”. They conclude in the same 
report that; “the root causes of environmental disaster in Haiti are acute poverty, rapid population 
growth and unplanned urbanization” (USAID, 2007:3). 
Similarly, Wisner et al (2003) considers how the spatial variety of nature provides different types of 
environmental opportunity and hazards. For example: ‘flood plains provide ‘cheap’ flat land for 
businesses and housing; the slopes of volcanoes are generally very fertile for agriculture; poor people 
can only afford to live in slum settlements in unsafe ravines and on low-lying land within and around 
the cities where they have to work’ (Wisner et al, 2003: 6).  
Another aspect regarding the social construct of risk is addressed by Dr. Elaine Enarson, a sociologist 
in the field of gender relations in disasters. She highlights in her working paper “Gender and Natural 
Disasters” how women face multiple gender discrimination- physical, social, economic, psychological 
discrimination- and how these factors exposes them to higher rates of poverty and violence 
compared to men. She further points out how gender relations are culturally and historically bound, 
where social conditions and traditional expectations often leave millions of women around the globe 
in substandard housing, socially marginalized, impoverished or economically insecure, overburdened 
with care giving responsibilities, and lacking social power and political voice (Enarson, 2000). 
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A report prepared by Michel Frost, a specialist on the human right situation in Haiti, illustrates that 
there was an increase in cases of violence against women by 150 per cent in the months following 
the earthquake (Isis International, n.d). 
Although some groups are more prone to disasters, Tierney (2006) and DfID (2005) remind us that no 
vulnerability exist in isolation- to a large extent, they are shaped by dynamic pressure that are rooted 
in development failures, both at a national and international level. Vulnerability is, thus, a reflection 
of development level, and plays a critical role in all aspects of sustainable development.  
3.1.3 Sustainable development 
 
The international leader and chairman of the World Commission of Environment and Development 
(WCED), Gro Harlem Brundtland defines sustainable development in the report, “Our Common 
Future: ”Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (UNDP, 2013:1).  
The definition contains within it two key concepts: 
• The concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given; and  
• The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environment's ability to meet present and future needs. 
(UNDP, 2013: 1)  
Brundtland further highlights that: ”Sustainable development includes human progress, 
improvements, and involvement of people in decision-makings.” (Brundtland, 1987: 7). The concept 
of sustainable development is constructed in three pillars as seen in figure 7: economic growth, social 
inclusion and environmental balance (UNDP, 2013). 
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3.1.4 The Pressure and Release (PAR) model 
Wisner et al (2003) approach the study of disaster from the risk and vulnerability perspective. 
Inherent to their claims in “At Risk” is the contention that social vulnerability and multifarious forms 
of risk are the root cause of disasters. They have developed a model that explains disaster risk in a 
broad perspective. The PAR model is internationally accepted for the analysing of progression of 
vulnerability (USAID, 2011 in Wisner et al, 2003). The PAR model (figure 8) is based on the commonly 
used equation:  
Risk (Disaster) = Hazard x Vulnerability.  
This formula represents the Wisner et al view that disaster risk is directly affected by the hazard 
produced and the degree of hazard vulnerability experienced by exposed persons in a particular 
period of time and space (Wisner et al, 2003). See figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8: The PAR model (Source: Wisner et al, 2003) 
 
Figure 7: The three pillars of sustainable development (Source: 
ECEFS, 2013) 
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The figure shows the risk of climate or anthropogenic disaster as the intersection between socio-
economic pressure on the left and physical exposure from natural hazards on the right. Increasing 
pressure can come from either side, but to relieve the pressure, vulnerability has to be reduced 
(Wisner et al, 2003: 50). 
The PAR model distinguishes between three components on the social side and one component on 
the natural side. The three forces on the social side are defined as follows: root causes, dynamic 
pressure and unsafe conditions. The component on the natural side is the natural hazards itself 
(Wisner et al, 2003). 
Root causes include economic, demographic and political processes within a society (including global 
processes) and distribution of resources between different groups of people. They reflect the 
distribution of power in a society, and are connected to the function or dysfunction of the state, and 
ultimately the nature of control exercised by the police and military and the capabilities of the 
administration (Wisner et al, 2003: 53). Wisner et al (2003) further highlights that people who are 
economically marginal, such as urban squatters, or people who live in environmentally ‘marginal’ 
environments, for example flood-prone urban locations, tend to be of marginal importance to those 
who hold economic and political power (Wisner et al, 2003: 53). One outcome of this is that people 
are likely to be a low priority for government interventions intended to deal with hazard mitigation. 
People that are viewed as economically and politically marginal are also more likely to stop trusting 
their own methods for self-protection, and to lose confidence in their own local knowledge. Even if 
they still have confidence in their own abilities, the ‘raw materials’ needed or the labour time 
required may have disappeared as a result of their economic and political marginality and low or 
uncertain access to resources (Wisner et al, 2003: 53). 
Dynamic pressure convert the effects of economic and political processes in local circumstances and 
has to be considered in relation to the different hazards people face. These dynamic pressures 
include amongst other epidemic diseases, rapid urbanization, violent conflicts, foreign debt and 
structural adjustment programmes (Wisner et al, 2003) 
Unsafe conditions are the specific forms in which people’s vulnerability is expressed in time and 
space. Examples put forward by Wisner et al (2003:55) includes people having to live in hazardous 
locations, being unable to afford safe buildings, lacking effective protection by the state (for instance 
in terms of effective building codes), having to engage in dangerous livelihoods, or having minimal 
food entitlements, or entitlements that are prone to rapid and severe disruption. Wisner et al (2003: 
55) also exemplifies the lack of disaster planning and preparedness, and a harmed environment.  
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In the PAR model, the community defines its own vulnerabilities and capabilities. They also decide 
what risks are acceptable to them and which are not. As Morrow (1999, in Wisner et al, 2003: 84) 
remarks:  
The proposed identification and targeting of at-risk groups does not imply helplessness or lack of 
agency on their part. … Just because neighbourhoods have been disenfranchised in the past does not 
mean they are unwilling or unable to be an important part of the process. There are many notable 
examples of grassroots action on the part of poor, elderly and/or minority communities…, and of 
women making a difference in post-disaster decisions and outcomes…. Planners and managers who 
make full use of citizen expertise and energy will more effectively improve safety and survival 
chances of their communities.  
3.1.5 Facing the humanitarian challenge of natural disasters 
 
Confronting the horrors of natural hazards, a series of international initiatives have begun to 
prioritize social vulnerability and community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR). The United 
Nations (UN) has long argued that we must address the root causes of disasters, not merely their 
symptoms.  Kofi Annan (in GTZ, 2002:20) has also explicitly demanded a paradigm shift from the 
prevalent 'culture of reaction' to a 'culture of prevention'. Devising preventive strategies that work, 
however, requires that we have a clear understanding of the underlying causes of vulnerability (UN, 
1999). As I showed in the previous section, vulnerability to extreme natural events comprises various 
factors that bear a close relationship to the development of a country or a region.  Nevertheless, the 
connection between underdevelopment and vulnerability is complex and a difficult task to enforce, 
especially in regards to building a culture of prevention. One of the reasons for this is that in many 
developing countries, the government and the private sector see preventive measures as cost factors 
rather than profitable investments (GTZ, 2002). The UN (1999:3) also acknowledges this aspect by 
stating ‘while the costs of prevention have to be paid in the present, its benefits lie in the distant 
future’. 
DRR initiatives 
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is a component of the Disaster risk management cycle (DRMC)5 and can 
be defined as “the systematic development and application of policies, strategies and practices to 
                                                          
5 GTZ (2002:19) defines DRM as “a series of actions (programmes, projects and/or measures) and instruments 
expressly aimed at reducing disaster risk in endangered regions, and mitigating the extent of disasters”. The 
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minimise vulnerabilities, hazards and the unfolding of disaster impacts throughout a society, in the 
broad context of sustainable development ” (Gero,  Meheux and Dominey-Howes, 2011: 102). As 
identified by Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR), a good management of today’s risk is a 
“starting point for facing tomorrows changed risk, whether from climate change, globalization or 
development. These three policy arenas share interests in monitoring changing risks, reducing 
exposure and vulnerability and advancing the transformation to resilience and sustainability” (IRDR, 
2014:2). 
Resilience  
It can be argued that the antithesis of vulnerability is resilience. Just like disaster and vulnerability, 
resilience is difficult to define, as there are discussions on whether the concept is a process leading to 
a desired outcome(s) or a desired outcome(s) in itself (Manyena, 2009). However, a general 
understanding is that resilience refers to the ability of an individual or a community to “bounce back” 
from the impact of hazards or disasters (Wildavsky et al, 2007 in Barley, 2011). Cordaid (2013: 4) 
defines resilience as “the capacity of an individual and/or a community to survive and bounce back 
from a hazard event, to go back to normal functioning, and to improve her or his condition towards 
full enjoyment of being an empowered human being and/or community”. However, Manyena 
(2009:24) argues that disaster resilience must be understood as the ability to “bounce forward” 
rather than “bouncing back” following a disaster. While “bounce back” implies the capacity to return 
to a pre-disaster state, “bounce forward” relates to a community or an individual’s ability to continue 
within the context of changed realities as a result of the disaster (Manyena, 2009:24). Thus, “bounce 
back” fails to capture the “new” reality created by disasters. It is also important to note that although 
resilience can be argued to be the opposite of vulnerability, Manyena (2009) claim that people can 
possess characteristics that both make them vulnerable and resilient. In addition, resilience building 
occurs at any phase or multiple phases of the DRM cycle (Manyena, 2009). 
Manyena (2009) also examines the interrelationships of resiliencies. She emphasize that resilience 
should also include infrastructure and other external aspects that can be beneficial to increase our 
understanding and application of the concept to wider frameworks. One example is “if buildings 
crumble to the ground in an earthquake, a community's resilience may be jeopardised, as roads are 
impassable due to debris (which hinders emergency response and the delivery of aid)” (Manyena, 
2009: 33). She also highlights that a community can be considered unsafe because its organization is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
traditional DRMC can be understood as a sequence of three main stages; 1) The Normal/Risk Reduction Stage 
2) The Emergency response Stage and 3) The Recovery Stage (Piper, 2011). 
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deficient, its economy is weak, that is, it has low capability to absorb the impacts, it has low 
capabilities to recover, would be another way of viewing resilience (Cardona, 2005 in Manyena, 
2009: 33). 
The connections between disaster recovery and the resilience of affected communities have become 
common features since the global DRR framework i.e. Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). This 
framework focused on the capacity of disaster-affected communities to recover with little or no 
external assistance following a disaster (Manyena, 2009). It has been noted that DRR is most 
effective at community level where specific local needs can be met (Cordaid, 2009). 
3.1.6 Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction (CMDRR)  
The CMDRR process is rooted in communities. In Cordaid (2013:4) conceptualization, “a community 
can be taken as a group that shares one or more things in common, such as place of residence, 
disaster risk exposure, or having been affected by a hazard event”.  
In the literature, a distinction is often made between two major DRR approaches at the community 
level. These are Community Managed DRR (CMDRR) and Community Based DRR (CBDRR). One of the 
fundamental differences is that CMDRR emphasize people’s participation during the entire project 
cycle, while in CBDRR information from the community is gathered to determine interventions, which 
are primarily dependent on external facilitators. In addition, in CMDRR the community implements 
the project while the external facilitator provides guidance. In the case of CBDRR, the facilitators 
implement the project while the community participates (Cordaid, 2013).  
As a disaster is localized and it happens in a community, I find it important that the community 
members are included to participate during the entire project.  As stated by Cordaid (2013: 4): 
“CMDRR is strategically important: its approach has communities become resilient and self-reliant, so 
that development initiatives are safe, secure and sustainable through time. CMDRR creates a 
sustainable intra-community working relationship, geared towards building group and community 
cohesiveness in achieving the task of risk reduction”. Therefore, my focus in this study is on CMDRR 
as this approach is viewed more sustainable and inclusive.  
The CMDRR process  
Rustico “Rusty” Binas, Cordaid’s Global Advisor on Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction, 
sees CMDRR as 
 “A process that mobilizes a group of people in a systematic way towards achieving a safe and 
resilient community/group. Its end view is a dynamic community that equalizes power relations, 
binds the group cohesively in the process of making decisions, deals with conflicts, resolves issues, 
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and manages individual and collective tasks through addressing and bouncing back from hazard 
events” (Cordaid, 2013: 3).  
According to this definition, CMDRR is recognized as a “bottom-up” process because solutions are 
generated through local knowledge and expertise, and not in the form of a request from higher 
authorities. Thus, CMDRR supports communities to empower themselves through taking control over 
their own destinies, rather than being passive recipients of aid (Cordaid, 2009).  However, for CMDRR 
to work, people have to understand and appreciate this bottom-up approach, including their own 
agency in the process. This further implies that the process requires some time in relationship 
building (Cordaid, 2009).  
Cordaid (2009) further identifies the components of the CMDRR process to be: 1) risk assessment 
and analysis; 2) DRR measures: developing contingency and development plans; 3) Self organization; 
and 4) participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning system.  
Within the first step, the community members themselves can identify community vulnerability and 
risk and start to prioritize a course of action in order to cope and adapt to disaster risk. One of the 
main challenges in this step is to ensure that CMDRR is truly participative and prevent selected 
groups from taking over the process while excluding other community members. Consequently, 
those with resources, power and knowledge can turn participatory processes into their advantage, 
whereas the excluded and marginalized often are unable to do so (Young, 1989:258). 
The second step is to make concrete plans and activities, which are usually based on traditional 
knowledge and activities that have been practised and handed down from generation to generation 
(Cordaid, 2009).  
The third step is self-organization, which entails that the community jointly implements these plans 
and activities, with support provided by the partners and sometimes the government or other 
agencies. The intervention is community owned and managed, and this empowers communities in 
their quest to further increase their own resilience. Even though it is the community’s responsibility 
to acquire the resources needed to carry out these activities, partner organizations can provide 
financial support for community-led-activities (Cordaid, 2009). 
The last step of the CMDRR process focuses on participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning. 
While there has been noted that such activities are still being developed, there exist an agreement 
that lessons learnt by communities and partners needs to be shared with others as it inspires and 
stimulates replicable and effective resilience building strategies (Cordaid, 2009). 
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The ultimate goal of CMDRR interventions is to build resilient communities. Communities can be 
considered resilient when they can pass through all the phases of the CMDRR process by themselves 
(Cordaid, 2013:4).  
The DRR formula for CMDRR is offered by Cordaid (2013), and can be translated into three areas of 
community-managed activities as seen below. 
Disaster risk (DR)= Hazard (H)x Vulnerability (V)    
                                           Capacity (C) 
1. Prevention and mitigation of hazards 
2. Reduction of vulnerabilities to hazards 
3. Strengthening capacities to cope and bounce back from hazards 
 
 
Figure 9: The three areas of community managed activities (Adopted from Cordaid, 2013:4) 
Hazard, coupled with vulnerability and lack of capacity to cope, translate into communities with high 
levels of risks. If disaster risk is reduced, the probability of the hazard event turning into a disaster is 
less (Cordaid, 2013).  
3.1.7 Genuine community participation in CMDRR  
 
The issue in which community members are invited to participate and the way their participation is 
elicited is of importance for how CMDRR provides positive development outcomes (Cordaid, 2009). 
Anisur Rahman, a development theorist defines public participation as: 
“Participation is justified because it expresses not only the will of the majority of people, but also it is 
the only way for them to insure that the important moral, humanitarian, social, cultural and 
economic objectives of a more humane and effective development can be peacefully attained” 
(Sachs 2005: 121). 
The key element in this definition is to create a human-centred development, in which people are 
given the opportunity to organize themselves in a manner that is best suited to meet their desires. 
Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Martha Nussbaum’s Human Development Approach further 
expand this view, where freedom, engagement, affiliation – the ability to engage in social interaction 
and have the freedom (capabilities) and supportive institutions to do so – is seen as essential 
components of the development of any society. The capability approach includes both material and 
non-material needs, as poverty is not only the lack of income and material goods, but also the lack of 
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rights to live a life full of possibilities and influence one’s own lives and development path. It also 
includes the concept of “functioning”, which indicates the broadening of human capacity to achieve 
things in life through self-actualization, education and access to healthcare (Robeyns, 2003 and 
Nussbaum, 2011:33–34). 
It has been observed that many DRR programmes have failed to be sustainable at local level after the 
completion of the project because effective community participation and capacity building has been 
lacking. Without participation, DRR efforts will not preserve and become sustainable (Pandey and 
Okazaki, 2005).  
3.2 Building back better: The lessons of Haiti  
3.2.1 The 2010 earthquake  
 
On 12th of January 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti at a shallow depth of 13 
kilometers. The epicenter was near Léoĝane not 25 km from Port-au-Prince, the capital (Patrick, 
2011).  The earthquake killed approximately 220,000 people, injured 300,000 and left over one 
million homeless. The disaster further resulted in immense humanitarian crisis, highlighting long-
lasting development challenges, as more than 60 per cent of government and administrative 
buildings, and 80 per cent of schools were destroyed  (ALNAP, 2010). The earthquake also left 1.5 
million people in various camps around the country. Four years later, many people continue to suffer 
the consequences. In 2014, 280,000 people were still displaced in various camps in and around the 
capital (UNHCR, 2014).  
While the natural dimensions to the 2010 earthquake was a tractable factor to the crisis that 
followed, the social construct of risk and vulnerability cannot be underestimated. Following the 
destructive earthquake, the response was made more difficult by severe underlying vulnerabilities 
including systematic poverty, fragile governance, insecurity and a continual threat of natural 
disasters (Patrick, 2011). (See section 2.1 and 2.3 for more information).  
The response to Haiti’s earthquake also involved a large number of actors including various UN 
agencies (including MINUSTAH), international and national civil society, the US and other 
international military as well as the Haitian government (Patrick, 2011:6). The capacities of many of 
these actors were severely affected as a consequence of the earthquake.  
 
 
   
 
34 
 Building Resilient Communities through Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes 
The national response capacity 
Haiti has frequently been categorised as a fragile and instable state. The weakness of the state 
apparatus and decades of poor governance are the main factors that explain the level of devastation 
caused by the earthquake as well as the slowness of the recovery (DEC, 2011 and ALNAP, 2010). On 
top of this limitation, the loss of important government personnel and severely damaged 
infrastructure, made it much more difficult for the government to respond to the following the 
earthquake (ALNAP, 2010). In addition, the National Disaster Risk Management System, Emergency 
Operations Centre and the Direction de la Protection Civile, Port au Prince’s main fire station and 
innumerable government vehicles were badly damaged or destroyed. However, even the most 
devastated governments retain capacities. The Haitian government made some important steps in 
resuming some core functions within the first days, such as making fuel available, repairing two of 
the four damaged electric plants, and reopening banks and paid public sector workers soon after 
(Patrick, 2011). 
When it comes to the recovery phase, NGOs are said to have taken on many of the responsibilities 
that would normally be that of the government, and according to some, to have more power than 
the state itself (DEC, 2011). One senior civil servant interviewed by DEC (2011) after the earthquake 
stated, “this response has further weakened national structures. The people who have come in have 
a very limited knowledge of the field, which is why we see little impact form the investments that 
have been made ” (DEC, 2011:7).  
However, collaboration has worked better with certain technical ministries, for example Merlin’s 
work with the health ministry, the Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP) 
regarding working within government guidelines to train ‘agents de santé’ and community health 
workers. It was also reported that some agencies were working with local authorities, including 
Action Aid who held regular meetings to improve coordination, and CARE who reported working with 
the Mayor of Carrefour’s office to support needs assessments and coordination activities (DEC, 2011: 
7). 
Local NGOs and INGOs 
NGOs were also slow in the immediate aftermath, and once in place, the coordination between 
NGOs and their national and local counterparts within the Haitian government and civil society was 
not sustained or extended to lower tiers of Haitian national or local government. Most individual 
agencies conducted their own need assessments, where each followed different standards, 
methodologies and focus thus limiting the usefulness of the results for an overall analyses or 
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strategic planning. Largely missing from these assessments were contextual analyses and capacity 
assessments of Haitian stakeholders (most notably the Haitian government), which would have 
allowed the humanitarian community a greater understanding of Haitian social and political 
dynamics and of the capacities of their natural Haitian partners across government and civil society 
to engage with and even lead recovery (Patrick, 2011). In addition, Haitians were largely excluded 
and poorly consulted from assessments, design, planning and delivery of the response that would 
have allowed a more joined-up approach both between stakeholders and with the transition to 
recovery (Patrick, 2011). This further disempowered the Haitian society.  A recent report made by 
Kathrine Haver (2011: 17) after the 2010 earthquake notes “people’s frustration is increasing as a 
result of the communication gap”. This has led to security incidents and more demonstrations 
against INGOs (Haver, 2011).  
The civil society  
Haitians dominated the early emergency response. Neighbours, friends, family and strangers helped 
each other, saving thousands of lives as they dug out the vast majority of people buried under the 
rubble. Building social capital was a key determinant, as solidarity between neighbours has proven 
important in helping cope with crises after the 2010 earthquake and on previous occasions (DEC 
2011). In a report carried out by DEC (2011) some organizations sought to do this in the relief stage 
through good programming approaches, for example working with street food vendors to enhance 
food security. 
However, as previously stated, the affected population was not consulted, informed or included in 
the humanitarian response (Patrick, 2011). Consequently, the affected people and local NGOs 
interviewed after the 2010 earthquake often underlined that they had often felt that they were not 
respected by INGOs (GPPI, 2011). 
GPPI (2011) highlights some reasons as to why people often were excluded from partaking in the 
planning and implementation of the humanitarian response. First, humanitarian agencies often 
commented on low levels of social capital and a weak sense of community engagement after the 
earthquake. They also saw Haitians as victims who had other things to do than rebuilding their 
country. Second, many humanitarians lacked knowledge about the Haitian context and culture, and 
could not speak Creole or French. This made it difficult for humanitarian organizations to understand 
the situation.  Third, humanitarians emphasized speed over inclusiveness. The local committee of 
Bristout‐Bobin showed, however, that inclusive implementation could be much more efficient than if 
international agencies did it alone. Third, the government did not effectively communicate with the 
population, which only upset people more. Finally, during the workshop organized with local NGOs 
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they recognized that it is difficult for international organizations to work with the very 
heterogeneous Haitian civil society sector (GPPI, 2010:42). 
3.2.2. Addressing future risks through DRR initiatives 
The Haitian National System for Risk and Disaster Management (SNGRD) - a network consisting of the 
Haitian Government’s Department of Civic Protections (DPC), the Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
Response Agency (CDEMA), and various civic groups- have engaged in natural disaster preparedness 
and response before the 2010 earthquake. However, the agencies have been hampered by limited 
resources, which in turn undermined its ability to coordinate disaster-related efforts effectively 
(Grunewald, Binder and Georges, 2010). Herard (2011: 12) also points out that political strife and 
instability has often left the government of Haiti in a position where it could only react to disasters 
when they occurred rather than being able to address the root causes of disaster in a comprehensive 
manner.  In addition, DRR featured low on Haiti’s development agenda prior to the 2010 earthquake. 
As the 2010 earthquake was the first of its kind experienced by the country in over two hundred 
years, the focus was rather on mitigating the effects of its most common natural disaster: hurricanes.  
As such, there was no civil guidance on what to do in the event of an earthquake and no modern 
building codes to minimise damage and a weak enforcement capability in any case (GPPI, 2010: 11). 
It has been stated, by amongst others Herard (2011), that the 2010 disaster could have been averted 
had sound construction practices been adhered to throughout the region.  While many, including 
Herard (2011) and DEC (2011), recognizes the importance of building seismic resistant homes, it has 
been noted that much of the reconstruction is being done as it had always been done. This has much 
to do with people’s desire to “put things back together” as they were before the earthquake, even if 
that means re-establishing old risks. The issues surrounding reconstruction do not just involve how to 
rebuild, but also where to rebuild (Herard, 2011). The issue of DRR concerning the structural safety of 
buildings is, thus, perceived vitally important given the seismic risk in Haiti (DEC, 2011).  
While the document Urban Disasters—Lessons from Haiti calls for long-term DRR to be a vital 
component of the post-disaster relief and recovery effort in order to avoid building back with the 
same mistakes as before, it also acknowledges that long-term solutions are best led by an effective 
and accountable government. However, the absence of a supportive and strong government in Haiti 
has made this process rather challenging. In effect, disaster coordination is predominately done by 
INGOs, which affects the DPC role to adequate serve as the lead entity in disaster response and 
recovery (Herard, 2011). The role of INGOs in Haiti is further examined in the next section. 
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3.3 Introducing Non-governmental organization- some diverging views 
NGOs have risen to prominence in the development field. There are several reasons for this 
spectacular growth. One reason can be linked to the emergence of what has been termed the 
theoretical impasse within development thinking. For example, the ideas on development vary over 
time, with later report engaging in the language of freedoms and capabilities more often (Alkire, 
2010). Health, education and living standards have been mentioned without exception, and since 
1990 the environment and ecosystem have received significant attention in most human 
development reports6. Particular attention has been given to the global water crisis and global 
warming (Alkire, 2010). Another set of reasons are related to the perception among many 
development agencies that governments of both the North and South have performed poorly in the 
fight against poverty, and that NGOs can form an alternative to the status quo. Fisher (1998: 2 in 
Lewis 2007:39) speaks of the increasing inability of the national state to develop as it confronts the 
long-term consequences of its own ignorance, corruption and lack of accountability. A third set of 
reasons has less to do with the way NGOs are viewed by outside agencies, and more to do with the 
ways in which NGOs themselves have contributed to this new profile. As traditional economic and 
political concerns of development shifted in the 1990s to include debates about the importance of 
environment, gender and human well-being, a growing NGO presence and policy voice became 
apparent (Lewis, 2007).  
As previously stated, Haiti is increasingly threatened by disasters that require rapid response and 
preparations for future disruptions and failures among a variety of actors and organizations. In Haiti, 
such response has mainly been carried out by INGOs and local NGOs. Since the 2010 earthquake, the 
development sector has been engaged in vigorous debate concerning the failure of aid and the 
INGOs response and reconstruction efforts.  
3.3.1 INGOs in Haiti 
 
As briefly explained in Chapter 2, fears of corruption have caused foreign donors to bypass the 
Haitian government, and as such, they often channel financial and material assistance through 
                                                          
6 United Nations Development program (UNDP) defines human development as: development aims to enlarge 
people’s freedoms to do and be what they value and have reason to value. In practice, human development also 
empowers people to engage actively in development on our shared planet. At all levels of development, human 
development focuses on essential freedoms: enabling people to lead long and healthy lives, to acquire 
knowledge, to be able to enjoy a decent standard of living and to shape their own lives. Many people value these 
freedoms in and of themselves; they are also powerful means to other opportunities. (Alkire, 2010:43) 
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INGOs. In effect, the Haitian people have learned to look to NGOs, both INGOs and local NGOs, 
rather than the government for provision of essential services (USIP, 2010 and Lewis and Kanji, 
2009). On one side, NGOs might expose the limitations of the status quo (Lewis et al, 2009).  On the 
other side, this could undermine democratic accountability, and thereby undermine the aims of aid 
itself in terms of contributing to enhance accountability (Mkandawire, 2010:1149– 1158 in Moss, 
Pettersson and Van de Walle, 2006: 14). It is even argued that aid itself helps the government 
“escape” accountability from their own citizens, as donors often fund and implement projects that 
the government fail to undertake, thereby easing popular frustration as well as freeing up 
government resources (Moss et al, .2006:18). 
Another consequence, addressed by USIP (2010), is the “brain drain” from the Haitian government to 
organizations funded by international donors. USIP (2010: 2) argues that private agencies are able to 
out-recruit the Haitian government by offering higher wages, benefits and better working condition. 
In this way, the best-educated Haitians were often enticed away from working for the government, 
practically immobilizing an already-demoralized bureaucracy. 
Many voices are also critical to INGOs suggesting that they impose their own development agenda, 
and as such become self-interested actors at the expense of the people they are in theory supporting 
(Lewis, 2007). This view, if it is correct, is in opposition to the values of the social capital concept, 
which is defined by Putnam as the “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993:167). Even Michael Edwards (2000 in Lewis, 2007:11), a long-standing 
writer and activist sympathetic to NGOs, writes: 
…few NGOs have developed structures that genuinely respond to grassroots demands. Although 
NGOs talk of ‘partnership’, control over funds and decision-making remains highly unequal ... The 
legitimacy of NGOs (especially those based in the North) is now an accepted topic of public debate …  
There have also been strong criticisms of INGOs that have not lived up to expectations in providing 
assistance in and after emergencies. This critic is relevant for Haiti as the country is a long way from 
realizing the goal of “building back better” five years after the earthquake. The criticism has been 
directed towards the lack of coordination, which in turn has led to duplication of efforts, limited 
understanding of local circumstances among INGOs, and a somewhat naive approach to the 
underlying causes of conflict and instability (Cunningham, 2012 and Lewis et al, 2009).  
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3.4 Theoretical framework 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE can strengthen the 
capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR programmes and to examine 
if such programs can generate sustainable development. This section aims to summarize the theories 
and concepts from the literature that are used to analyse the empirical data. 
This study drew on the work of Wisner et al (2003) to define natural disasters. They understand 
natural disasters as a product of social, political and economic environments. This thesis recognises 
that the natural and the social cannot be separated from each other: to do so invites a failure to 
understand the additional burden of natural hazards, and it is unhelpful in both understanding 
disasters and doing something to prevent them. Examples of natural hazards that can be turned into 
natural disasters include floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, erosion, wildfires, tornadoes, and volcanic 
eruptions (Wisner et al, 2003). This study focus mainly on the 2010 earthquake, but I also recognize 
the on-going threat that for example storms and floods possesses within these two communities in 
Carrefour district.  
As natural disasters are linked to a country´s, community or individuals political, socioeconomic and 
environmental dimension, I found it important to understand the concept of vulnerability. In the case 
of Haiti, these vulnerabilities are according to the literature attached to geological location, 
deforestation, political instability, acute poverty, rapid population growth, unplanned urbanization 
and social inequalities among other factors (Wisner et al, 2003: 4 and USAID, 2007:3).  In this paper, 
vulnerability is seen as a concept that focuses on “limitation or lack of access to resources” 
(Bradshaw, 2004:10).  However, this paper also supports Tierney (2006) and DfID (2005) perception 
that no vulnerability exist in isolation as they are shaped by dynamic pressure that are rooted in 
development failures, both at a national and international level.  
In this study, the PAR model is applied as a simple tool for assessing people’s vulnerability to 
earthquakes through the social components of root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions. 
I recognize that the generation of vulnerability is not adequately integrated with the way in which 
the earthquake affected people; it is a static model. It exaggerates the separation of the earthquake 
from social processes in order to emphasise the social causation of the disaster that followed (Wisner 
et al, 2003: 90-91). 
A natural hazard that turns into natural disasters also needs to be seen in relation to climate change. 
This thesis acknowledge that due to the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, our 
climate is, and will continue to change, despite efforts to curb emissions (ISDR, 2008). It is therefore 
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necessary to brace ourselves to some extent for coming changes, particularly with regard to 
vulnerable populations and those likely to experience proportionally more negative impacts.  
For that reason, a series of international initiatives have begun to prioritize social vulnerability and 
community-based disaster risk reduction to generate sustainable development.  Kofi Annan (in GTZ, 
2002:20) has explicitly demanded a paradigm shift from the prevalent 'culture of reaction' to a 
'culture of prevention'. Although I recognize that all components of the DRM cycle is critical to the 
overall success and sustainability, my focus in this study is on the DRR stage at a community level, 
also known as CMDRR. CMDRR is understood in this paper as “a process that mobilizes a group of 
people in a systematic way towards achieving a safe and resilient community/group.  Its end view is a 
dynamic community that equalizes power relations, binds the group cohesively in the process of 
making decisions, deals with conflicts, resolves issues, and manages individual and collective tasks 
through addressing and bouncing back from hazard events” (Cordaid, 2013: 3). However, this thesis 
adopts the view that resilience refers to the ability of an individual or community to “bounce 
forward” after a disaster, as “bounce back” fails to capture the “new” reality created by disasters 
(Manyena, 2009:24). I also recognize that people can possess characteristics that make them both 
vulnerable and resilient. 
Further, CMDRR is recognized as a “bottom-up” process because solutions are generated through 
local knowledge and expertise, and not in the form of a request from higher authorities. Thus, 
CMDRR supports communities to empower themselves through taking control over their own 
destinies, rather than being passive recipients of aid (Cordaid, 2009).  This approach has been 
acclaimed as the most effective and sustainable in environmental and developmental management 
(Cordaid, 2009). 
An assessment of CARE Haiti’s operation in Carrefour district will be carried out within Cordaid’s 
framework for CMDRR. (See section 3.1.5). Considering the crucial role that public participation plays 
to strengthen CMDRR programmes, I find it essential to say that the quality of such programs are 
directly connected to the quality of its public engagement and involvement. In other words, civil 
society engagement throughout public participation can help keep the entrusted NGO (in my case 
CARE) accountable for their actions. However, evidence suggests that in the case of Haiti, many 
people felt excluded from the planning and implementation process. I will examine if this is the case 
for the people living in Carrefour district. 
Building a culture of prevention has shown difficult in Haiti. One of the main reasons for this is that 
the government see preventive measures as cost factors rather than profitable investments (GTZ, 
2002). In effect, the aid-dependency and limited capacity of the state has led to foreign donors 
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increasingly stepping into the government’s shoes (USIP, 2010 and Lewis et al, 2009). Zanotti (2010) 
and Ramachandran et al (2012) argue that the weakness of government institutions is largely due to 
the history of aid dependence and foreign interventions. The country is heavily aid-dependent with 
70 % of the state budget coming from external financing (Zanotti, 2010). Most of the services such as 
health and education are therefore provided by INGOs or local NGOs (Zanotti, 2010 and World Bank, 
2014). The dominance of NGOs in Haiti has created a parallel state said to be more powerful than the 
government itself (DEC, 2010). As already pointed out in the Chapter 1, it is important to note that a 
distinction is made between INGOs and local NGOs. When referring to INGOs in this paper, I mean 
those NGOs where the senior staff originates from other countries (Ghimire, 2003). INGOs such as 
CARE are the main subject of this study. By local NGOs, I mean formal organisations of people who 
are engaged in local activities that are not primarily for their own benefit (Ghimire, 2003). The term 
NGOs will also be applied when I am referring to both INGOs and local NGOs.  
Based on the literature INGOs are seen as having an important (although not necessarily always 
positive) role to play in development. When it comes to the relevance of INGOs in a Haitian context, 
strong criticisms of INGOs has been given as they have not lived up to expectations in providing 
assistance, especially after the 2010 earthquake. The criticism has been directed towards the lack of 
coordination, leading to duplication of efforts, limited understanding of local circumstances among 
INGOs, and a somewhat naive approach to the underlying causes of conflict and instability.  
In considering CARE Haiti’s potential as capacity building agents for the CMDRR process in Carrefour 
district, I find it necessary to study the relationship between CARE and the recipient community. In 
order for INGOs to create an interdependent relation, it is essential that they are aware of the social 
and environmental interests of the community members. This aspect will be evaluated throughout 
my investigation, as to address if CARE has responded to the interests of the local community. 
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Chapter 4 Methodological approach 
 
This chapter will describe and justify the main methodological approach applied for this study, 
including; choice of research strategy and research design, sampling, methods of data collection, 
data analysis and ethical considerations. In this chapter, I will give a particular emphasis on the 
various challenges encountered during my study in Haiti and my role in the field.   
4.1 Qualitative methodology with a case study design 
As previously stated, the key purpose of this study is to explore whether, and to what extent, CARE 
can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote resilient communities through CMDRR 
programmes and to examine if such programmes can generate sustainable development. On a 
practical level, this means going into depth in terms of understanding the relationship between these 
actors, and how this relationship influence development outcomes. In terms of epistemology, an 
interpretive standpoint is therefore adopted, mainly because I want to adopt a research strategy and 
a methodology that “answer the whys and how’s of human behaviour, opinion and experience” 
(Guest et al, 2013: 1). As better explained by Geertz (1973 in Guest et al, 2013:6); 
“To look at the symbolic dimensions of social action—art, religion, ideology, science, law, morality, 
common sense—is not to turn away from the existential dilemmas of life for some empyrean realm 
of deemotionalized forms; it is to plunge into the midst of them. The essential vocation of 
interpretive anthropology is not to answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us 
answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in 
the consultable record of what man has said”. 
In regards to ontological considerations, a constructivist standpoint is adopted, which challenge the 
suggestion that organisation and culture are pre-given factors, but rather understands the social 
world and social entities as created by and dependent upon the actions of human beings, actions in 
which are a constant state of revision. In effect, this means that the researcher (me) presents a 
specific version of a social reality, rather than one that can be regarded as definitive (Bryman, 2012).  
Based on these considerations, a qualitative research strategy is seen as the most appropriate. 
Qualitative research aims to obtain in-depth understanding of cultural phenomenon and human 
behaviour in a natural setting. Qualitative research can be defined this way:  
“Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its 
subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
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attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 2).  
Research design 
According to Bryman (2012:50), there are five main types of research design: Experimental design, 
cross-sectional or survey design, longitudinal design, case study design, and comparative design. My 
research is a case study design that is concerned with the complexities and particular nature of a 
single organization (CARE Haiti) and its operation (CMDRR programme) in Carrefour district, in Port 
au Prince. The case study design is chosen, as it is particularly helpful in the “generation of an 
intensive, detailed examination of a case” (Bryman, 2012: 68).  
4.2 Sampling  
In qualitative research, the discussion of sampling revolves around the notion of purposive sampling-
a non-probability form of sampling- with the direct reference to the research questions being asked 
(Bryman, 2012: 416-418). My research is no exception in this regard, as my research questions 
provided a strategic guideline as to what categories of people that need to be the focus of attention.  
My research questions suggested that the two main categories to be sampled should be participants 
that were implementers (CARE Haiti) or recipients (community members) of the CMDRR programme.  
It was important for me that those who participated could provide their knowledge, experiences and 
opinions in an expressive and reflective manner. Even though critics might argue that a sample of this 
nature may not be representative enough, and suggest probability sampling as an alternative, my 
aim was rather to select a sample that would give me the broadest and most comprehensive 
understanding (Bryman, 2012).  
Using Care as a starting point was an obvious choice, considering that CARE was engaged with 
different DRR projects in and around Port au Prince. Julie Razongles, project manager of the 
Neighbourhood Beautification project at CARE, functioned as a door opener. She introduced me to 
Valery Simeon-the one responsible for the implementation of the CMDRR programme in four 
neighbourhoods in Carrefour.  
Together with CARE, I selected two neighbourhoods; Ti-Sous and La Grenade. The first 
neighbourhood was in its initial phase of implementing a workshop on CMDRR initiatives, while the 
second neighbourhood had just finished the workshop on CMDRR. By participating in the different 
steps in the CMDRR process, I was able to observe; who participated, what role the participants had, 
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both within the community group and within the organization. In addition, I was able to explore the 
level of success as perceived by the implementers (CARE) and recipients (community members).  
Within CARE, I interviewed one person in a leadership position, and two persons working directly on 
programme implementation. I also had an interview with the gender advisor, which has proven to be 
important in the understanding of gendered vulnerability in natural disasters. The sample also 
involves 72 respondents (from both individual interviews and FGDs) living in the two 
neighbourhoods; Ti-Sous and La Grenade; where 25 were women and 47 were men. I have in total 
conducted four FGDs; one with only women and three mixed FGDs; with both women and men. In 
addition, I have conducted 12 in-depth interviews, as it was important for me that the respondents 
had the opportunity to express themselves without being questioned by others. Often when people 
are in a group setting, the dominant opinion of the “strongest” person may persist and dominate 
(Bryman, 2012). Each of the in-depth interviews lasted for more than one hour.  
Another important aspect while conducting my research was to gain information from different 
social levels, as the people affected can experience vulnerability and the relationship with CARE 
differently based on their educational level, ethnical, geographical and social background. However, 
despite the fact that the participants were both educated and uneducated, and that their jobs 
ranged from being a DJ and a rapper to a master student in humanitarian administration, they all 
seemed to have similar if not equal perceptions of their social and environmental reality.  This was 
also evident when it came to gender (male and female) or differences in age (adult and children).   
As a means of gaining a greater understanding of the complexities regarding the CMDRR process, and 
to understand the broader picture of NGO interventions a set of key informants outside of the CARE 
organization and the two neighbourhoods were also identified and interviewed. This way, I was able 
to present a more objective and critical analysis of my case, in addition to strengthen the credibility 
of my findings. They include Project Haiti; operating in Delmas and PLAN Haiti; operating in Croix-
des-Bouquets. I did not include these interviews in the data collection as such, but rather used them 
as a baseline to discuss my findings and to reflect and compare upon different realities. In this sense, 
these informants became more of a “reality check” on my part, to see if my interpretations of the 
Haitian context were misguided, and to get a better understanding of the context CARE were 
operating in. 
I spent one day with Project Haiti, interviewing 7 children and 14 women. I was also able to talk with 
Luc Edwin Ceide, the director and project coordinator for Project Haiti. He was also our host while 
living in Haiti, which meant that I was able to create a more solid relationship with him and gain 
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access to his personal viewpoints. This was important for my investigation as it allowed me to ask 
questions that were more personal.  
I also spent two days with PLAN Haiti, where I conducted two FGDs; one with ten girls and one with 
10 boys. I also talked to the DRR manager and the organization manager.  
Organization Number of participants Method of data collection 
CARE Haiti 75 12 in-depth interviews, 4 FGDs 
and Participant Observation 
Project Haiti 21 1 in-depth interview and 2 
FGDs 
PLAN Haiti 22 2 in-depth interviews and 2 
FGDs 
Act Alliance  1 In-depth interview 
Total respondents: 119 
Figure 10: An overview of organisations, number of participants and method of data collection involved in 
my study (Figure made by author, 2015) 
4.3 Data collection methods 
In order to undertake ethnographic research, different data collection techniques are used to 
comprehend different realities. These techniques include amongst others participatory observation, 
interviews, focus groups and video/photographic (Crang and Cook, 2011: 7). The primary method of 
data collection in this study was in-depth interviews and FGDs with community members and CARE 
staff. In addition, I was able to observe and participate in two workshops concerning DRR initiatives. I 
also reviewed a range of relevant documents, in particular evaluation reports from CARE. However, 
they were mainly used for triangulation purposes; to compare and detect misunderstandings or 
inconsistencies in the information I received from the interviews and the FGDs. Lastly, I also used a 
self-completion questionnaire developed by CARE as a supplement to the qualitative data collection 
techniques in order to get clarification of some issues raised.  
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4.3.1 In-depth interviews 
 
Through in-depth interviewing, detailed information about people’s thoughts and behaviours can be 
explored. In this sense, interviewing people provided me with more detailed information than what 
was available through other data collection methods, such as surveys (Thagaard, 2011). 
Thagaard (2011) presents three interview forms that fall into the categories of structured, semi 
structured and unstructured interviews. The semi-structured interview is the one mostly used in 
qualitative research, and the form I have employed in my study. The themes are often prepared 
beforehand, but the order of themes is determined during the interview. Flexibility is especially 
important for this form, as the researcher must be able to tie new questions to what the respondents 
deem important (Thagaard, 2011). I had prepared an interview guide before I entered the field. 
However, this interview guide changed as new information was obtained. (See the interview guide 
under appendices).  
My individual interviews with PLAN and Project Haiti were conducted together with my fellow 
researcher, Maria Sjuve, as we had a similar approach to our study and because it was more 
convenient for us as we had to pay for a driver and a car. We had both prepared an interview guide 
and took turns in asking questions. For Maria and me it was a good way of crosschecking the 
information collected.    
My main worry before the fieldwork started was whether people would feel restricted to speak to 
me.  My background including elements such as gender, age, educational level and cultural norms 
not only affect the way I positioned myself in the field, but the way people perceived me. In addition, 
I was with an organization that funds some of their activities. I was made aware of the fact that many 
who have been interviewed by NGOs often say what they think “we” want to hear in order to receive 
more benefits.  
In the case of CARE and Project Haiti, these aspects were, however, not a hindrance. In all of my 
interviews and FGDs, I presented myself as a master student eager to learn about their reality and 
life. They seemed to appreciate that somebody came to hear their views and document their 
perception of things. Furthermore, they were not afraid to express criticism and frustration over 
their situation, and when talking about sensitive things, including their relationship and perception of 
NGOs in general and CARE Haiti in particular, they would use their whole bodies to carry forward 
their points of view, which was often negative.  
The main challenge with conducting interviews was, however, the language barrier, which required 
the use of a translator. There are implications when sensitive information goes through a third 
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person, which may lead to misunderstandings and loosing important details. In my case, the use of a 
translator proved to be efficient in accessing and comprehending data, even though I recognize that 
some information might have bypassed me. Through an acquaintance of our host, I was introduced 
to my translator. He grew up with his family in Carrefour, in a neighbourhood close to where I 
collected my data. He was a student and worked as a translator for other humanitarian 
organizations. I quickly developed a friendship with my translator, he was my age and we shared 
similar interests, which made the communication between us easier. Seeing that his family had been 
affected by natural disasters, he felt the need to broaden his knowledge about my research topic. He 
worked as my translator in all my interviews with CARE Haiti. We were able to discuss and reflect 
upon the different situations afterwards.  My interpreter explained and contextualized the cultural 
codes, which I would not have been able to understand without his support. Therefore, his role was 
beneficial for my fieldwork, since culture is embedded in language. I used a different translator in my 
interviews with Project Haiti and PLAN Haiti. He also functioned as a supportive actor during the 
interviews, and had much experience with being a translator for students and aid workers.  
4.3.2 Focus group discussion (FGD) 
 
In order to investigate my research questions, FGDs were also employed. The focus group technique 
is essentially a group interview, involving more than one, usually more than four interviewees. In 
comparison with semi-structured interviews, that span very widely, focus groups typically emphasize 
a specific theme or topic in depth, a topic that the respondents deem important or significant 
(Bryman, 2012). Some of the themes discussed in the FGDs included; social vulnerability to natural 
disasters, DRR, climate change, the government’s role, aid dependency and their perception of NGOs 
and CARE Haiti.  
By collecting data through FGDs, I was able to work more efficiently, as I had a limited timeframe. In 
addition to the limited timeframe, I had to travel from Petionville to Carrefour, which often was time 
consuming because of the chaotic traffic and the many street protests. More importantly, I was 
interested in how the individuals respond to each other’s views and opinions, and how they build up 
a view out of the interaction that took place within the group. As such, a wide variety of different 
views in relation to a specific topic was provided, where the respondents challenged each other’s 
views. My main interest was to generate a good discussion about issues that the participants deemed 
important, without me asking about it. One of the themes that often generated a discussion amongst 
the participants was disempowerment, as they often felt deprived from influencing their own 
development.  This way, I felt that FGDs was more naturalistic than one-on-one interviews, and I 
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ended up with a more realistic account of what the respondents thought, as they were in charge of 
the discussion.  
It is important to note that all respondents in Carrefour district and in Delmas 33 had heard about 
the term DRR and climate change from other NGOs, or from Project Haiti. The high knowledge level 
generated vivid and constructive discussions. I also think that more people wanted to voice their 
opinion because they knew something about the topics and issues that were being discussed. In a 
sense, I think FGDs made people feel empowered. However, in the case of PLAN Haiti the 
participants had not heard about the term DRR, which I found strange considering the vulnerable 
state of Haiti and PLAN’s operational focus on education. I see this as a limitation that needs to be 
addressed internally within this organization. These aspects will be elaborated in the following 
chapters on findings and analysis.  
Another argument that is relevant to my case is that a FGD has a further role in allowing the voices of 
highly marginalized groups of women to surface. As such, focus groups constitutes an opportunity for 
women to empower themselves by making sense of their experience of vulnerability and 
subjugation. I therefore had one separate FGD in La Grenada with only female respondents in order 
to ensure gender sensitivity. This proved to be a good approach as male domination over women 
was evident in Carrefour. However, in a few mixed FGDs some women took eagerly part in the 
discussions. 
The focus groups sessions were tape-recorded and after each session I transcribed the interviews. I 
always made sure that I had informed consent before I taped the sessions. I did find this process to 
be more time consuming as compared to regular interviews as I had to take into account that was 
talking in the sessions. In addition, the FGD lasted longer; some discussions lasted up to several 
hours.  
The main challenge with FGDs was that the number of participants was high, ranging from seven 
participants to twenty participants. In two CMDRR workshops, it was 35 participants. However, in 
these workshops I only observed the participants and the CARE staff. Morgan (1999 in Bryman, 2012: 
507) recommends that a typical group size should be six to ten members. It was evident that in the 
FGDs that had most participants a few people dominated the discussions compared to those groups 
consisting of 7 or 10 participants. However, as I also conducted smaller FGDs, in-depth interviews 
and had a two-day observation of the CMDRR workshops I feel confident in that the different 
methods compensates for the challenges of being many participants.   
Another challenge that occurred was during my field visit to Croix-des-Bouquets.  I felt like the 
participants in the two FGDs were worried about how the information they gave me would affect 
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future funding to the schools, and considering that the PLAN staff was present during the interviews, 
I decided to discard some of the suspect data to maintain a truthful study. In addition, PLAN had 
promised the respondents (children) something in return for speaking to us (Maria was also present). 
PLAN first wanted a lot of money, 30 000 gourdes, which is around 4500 NOK, to buy food for the 20 
children themselves. We found this to be obscene, as it does not cost this amount of money to buy 
some refreshments. In addition, we felt uncomfortable paying for food and drinks to gain 
information.  It became clear in later discussions with Plan that it used to be common for the 
organisations to give people money, food or other resources in order to motivate them to talk or 
participate in various activities. Although they had stopped this kind of “direct benefits” ten years 
ago they have faced major challenges with staff on the ground that was not loyal to this new policy 
and kept up the old policies of giving people incentives.  
4.3.3 Participant observation 
 
Data obtained through interviewing and FGDs can contradict with their behaviour. Given the 
frequency of human inconsistence, observation can be a powerful check against what people report 
about themselves. Through participant observation, researchers can take part in people’s activities 
and work to gain a greater understanding of relations and interactions between people in different 
social settings in which study participants live (Thagaard, 2011). According to Bryman (2012: 494), 
the participant observer or ethnographer is in much closer contact with people for an extended 
period of time, observing behaviour, learning the native language, gaining a foothold on social 
reality.  
Even though observation was not the main source of data in my study, I participated in two out of 
eight of the DRR workshops initiated and carried out by CARE. The same community members 
participated in both meetings. It was truly educational to be part of the participation group as I 
gained valuable insight into how these workshops functioned in practice. More importantly, I was 
able to see how people behaved within these specific settings, and how the relationship and 
communication between the CARE staff and the participants unfolded in a natural setting throughout 
the processes. An example of my observation was how honest the participants were towards CARE. 
The community members were at first sceptical to the CMDRR workshops as other interventions had, 
in their opinion, been a waste of time. The main reason for the participants concern was that they 
had felt excluded from partaking in these interventions. (See section 6.2.3. for more information 
about local perception about CARE and other INGOs).  
One of the activities during the first day of the workshop was that the participants should write down 
on a post-it note what their motivation for this DRR training was, and moreover, what they wanted 
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from of the training. After the participants had written down their opinions, the post-it notes were 
collected and shared on the blackboard. The answers given generated a good discussion for me to 
observe, and I gained a lot of information about their concerns and hopes.  
4.3.4 Documents as a source of data 
 
There is a lot of documentation within CARE that has been of interest. I focused primarily on annual 
reports, mission statement, press releases and evaluations where these were available. I was also 
able to gain access to documents used in the DRR workshops as well as memos from the meetings. 
These documents were mainly used in order to provide context, as well as to compare my findings 
from the interviews and focus group discussions to the documents for the purpose of triangulation. 
In effect, the documents were not analysed in depth, but used to compare specific information.  
When assessing the documents, it has been important for me to keep in mind Scott’s four criteria for 
assessing the quality and usefulness of documents; namely authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (Bryman, 2012: 551) The criteria of credibility is particularly 
important, especially when it comes to assessing documents from organisations. According to my 
experience, organisations and internal evaluators often have a tendency to downplay criticism and 
inflate positive findings, as they are eager to please their respective funders and to maintain the 
operations. These aspects will be examined in the following chapter, under my findings. 
 4.3.5 Self-completion questionnaire 
 
In addition to the data collection techniques mentioned above, CARE had also developed a standard 
self-completion questionnaire, which the community members participating in the CMDRR workshop 
had to fill in before and after the training program. This was an important part of the workshop, 
namely to see the rate of a person's progress in gaining knowledge and new skills regarding DRR. The 
main advantages of this technique are that it is cheaper and quicker to administer compared to 
interviews (Bryman, 2012). It is also important to measure the educational level of the participants in 
order to see if the CMDRR process had been successful.  
As I was only able to participate in the first two out of eight workshops, CARE Haiti have therefore 
sent me the results after the final test. (An overview of the interview guide and the standard test is 
to be fund under appendices). 
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4.4 Data analysis 
Qualitative data consist of people’s perceptions of the world and observation of their behaviour in a 
social setting, and not numbers (Powell and Renner, 2003). As such, in my analysis I focused on the 
text from my transcripts of interviews and FGDs, and my notes from the participation observation 
sessions. This reflective process began as the data was collected and continued after the data 
collection had ceased. My main goal was to understand what the participants really though, felt and 
did in vulnerable situations. Based on the texts I was able to “get behind the numbers” and to see the 
richness of people’s real social experiences. From a theoretical standpoint this means that 
“qualitative data analysis tends to be inductive as the analyst identifies important categories in the 
data, as well as patterns and relationships, through a process of discovery” (Guest et al, 2013:322). 
There is no straightforward way of doing this, and the process will depend on the questions asked, 
the information provided and the researcher’s resources (Powell et al, 2003). However, according to 
Guest et al (2013:322) a good qualitative data analyses are “distinguished by their focus on the 
interrelated aspects of the setting, group, or person under investigation—the case— rather than 
breaking the whole into separate parts”. In effect, the whole is understood to be greater than the 
sum of its parts, and so the social context of events, thoughts, and actions becomes essential for 
interpretation (Guest et al, 2013). 
Within this framework, I have applied a progressive focus, which is understood as a process by which 
a researcher interacts with the data and gradually refines the focus (Guest et al, 2013:322). My initial 
research objective was modified early on in the study as new issues that I deemed important and 
interesting became apparent. Initially, I was going to conduct a research on “how the local 
government promotes and includes community members in DRR programs”. However, as I gained 
information about this topic I learned that the government had not been present in these 
communities, neither before nor after the 2010 earthquake.  As such, I began to listen and observe 
selectively, focusing on those events that the participants deemed important, and topics I found 
interesting. Eventually, the data became the starting point for the development of codes, concepts 
and theories, and thus, the data formed my research. 
The technique applied for my data analysis 
Powell et al (2003) have given some useful guidelines on how qualitative data can be analysed. I 
found the five-step process developed by Powell et al (2003) helpful in order to manage and 
systematize my data.  
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In the first step, I had to understand the data, and consider the quality of data provided from the 
individual interviews and FGDs. This meant that I had to re-read the text and listen to the recordings 
several times in order to understand the content and the meanings expressed. In the second step, I 
had to identify a few key questions that I wanted to analyse and to answer.  I focused on one topic or 
question at a time, and put all the data about that specific topic from different respondents together. 
In the next step, I had to organize the data into categories and subcategorise. In this step, themes, 
patterns and connections were identified; both similarities and differences. In step four, I was able to 
see patterns and connections both within and between the categories. I was also able to address the 
importance of each category. In the last step, I used the themes and connections from the literature 
to explain my findings. By relating the findings from my case study to theoretical concepts, I was able 
to suggest some analytical generalizations beyond the particular case study of CARE’s 
implementation of CMDRR programmes, in addition to their relationship with the community 
members. I believe that this approach will contribute to our overall understanding of how NGOs (in 
my case INGOs) influences people’s participation in development. In addition to this, I included 
quotes and descriptive examples to illustrate my points and to bring the data to life (Powell et al, 
2003).  
One of the main challenges with this process was to minimize the way my preconceptions and pre-
knowledge influenced both the data collection and data analysis.  My educational background in 
development and my norms, values and culture influenced my perspective and the way I chose to 
position myself, but there is never only one truth or only one perspective. I was also in the field with 
CARE officers, which made me an “insider” of an organization. By working so close with CARE I might 
have had pre-conceived ideas of what I should look for and what I would find, and people might have 
felt restricted talking to me. However, as previously explained, this was not a hindrance as people 
were more than willing to speak openly with me about challenges and controversial issues. They 
even voiced criticism toward CARE’s operation.  
This aspect is embedded within the concepts of trustworthiness and authenticity, and influenced the 
quality of my data.  Guba and Lincoln support this claim as they argue that there can be more than 
one and possible several accounts of truth about the social world. As I was active in the knowledge 
construction, I recognized and reflected upon my own agency and social distance to the respondents 
throughout the whole process (Bryman, 2012: 389-391). I have also addressed this challenge by 
applying several data collection methods. 
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4.5 Ethical considerations 
Before I went to Haiti I asked myself, “What is the meaning of ethics and ethical behaviour? It 
seemed straightforward, as I have dealt with ethnical issues before, both in my daily life and in other 
studies. However, I was soon remained that each case is different as it depends upon the context in 
culture, age and gender in addition to complex array of conflicting interests. For example, the 
interest of CARE did not always reflect the interest of the community members. Therefore, I found 
Diener and Crandall (1978 in Bryman, 2012:135)) four main areas of un-ethics in research valuable. 
These are harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy and deception. 
As some of the topics discussed were personal and difficult to talk about, it was increasingly 
important that I respected the participants at all stages of the process, especially in terms of the 
children participating. One way I ensured that no harm was made towards the participants was that 
all records of individuals were maintained confidential. Throughout my research, I also provided the 
participant with enough information that was needed to ensure that they could make an informed 
decision about whether or not they wanted to participate. This tactic also helped to ensure honesty 
amongst the participants as each person who was approached was given the opportunity to refuse to 
participate in the study.   
I also presented myself, and my research, according to the truth. Over all, I tried my best to provide 
an environment that was trustworthy, and at the same time, I tried to avoid creating a top-down 
relationship, where I as a researcher held a form of power over the participants. I avoided this by 
presenting myself as independent from the organizations. This was particularly important for me in 
regards to the children. 
Another important concern regarding ethics for me, as a researcher was simply to do my best to 
ensure that the presented findings in this thesis are consistent with how the participants experienced 
their social and environmental reality.    
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Chapter 5 Introducing the organisations in this case study 
 
In order to understand the roles, values and strategies of the organizations involved in my study and 
to have a meaningful discussion in next chapter, this chapter provides some relevant information 
about CARE, as well as Project Haiti and PLAN. The first two are leading international humanitarian 
organizations with a broad operational focus including both emergency relief and long-term 
development programs. Project Haiti is a family run charitable organization with a focus on 
education, capacity building and empowerment.  
As explained in the previous chapter, my main collaboration for this study has been with CARE. CARE 
has been the major source of information, both in terms of putting me in contact with respondents, 
but also in giving me relevant information in regards to the topic in general. Since CARE was the main 
source of information, this chapter will mainly focus on them. 
5.1 Introducing CARE and its operation in Carrefour district 
About CARE 
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) is a world leading humanitarian 
organization that delivers emergency relief and operate long-term international development 
projects. The NGO was founded in the aftermath of World War 2 (1945) to deliver food and supplies 
to war-torn Europe by the means of the “CARE Packages”. Since then, the organization has grown to 
become one of the largest humanitarian aid organizations in the world: working in over 87 countries 
and reaching over 72 million people in 2012 (CARE, 2013a).  
Guided by the aspirations of local communities, the organization “strives to serve individuals and 
families in the poorest communities in the world”. In order to reach their mission a broad range of 
topics are addressed. These includes amongst other emergency response, disaster relief, food 
security, water and sanitation, women’s empowerment, economic development, climate change, 
agriculture, education and health (CARE, 2013b). 
CARE in Haiti 
CARE began working in Haiti in 1954, following the Hurricane Hazel. What started as a relief 
assistance project quickly shifted to a development program in 1959 with a focus on maternal and 
child nutrition. In the 1970s, the organization broadened their focus to include a range of topics, and 
today CARE’s work in Haiti reflects an integrated approach, with project on HIV and AIDS, 
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reproductive health, maternal and child health, education, food security, emergency response 
efforts, DRR, and water and sanitation (CARE, 2013c).   
CARE operates as an INGO in Haiti, as it is a part of CARE International where all its funding is 
generated by fundraising offices in developed countries, such as the UN, and channelled through 
CARE international to CARE Haiti (Personal interview, 2015).  
After the 2010 earthquake, CARE launched a global appeal and immediately started the distribution 
of emergency relief supplies, providing food, clean water, temporary shelters and other services to 
more than 300 000 people. The organization focused on five key relief sectors; emergency shelter; 
sexual and reproductive health; water, sanitation and hygiene; education; and food security. They 
concentrated on the heavily affected areas of Carrefour and Léogâne, near the earthquake’s 
epicentre, with additional interventions in indirectly affected areas. In the long term, CARE has been 
working to rebuild and improve livelihoods and helped Haitian communities to become more 
resilient in the face of future disasters. Their focus on local resilient building is imperative as rising 
food prices, climate change and disasters force families further into poverty (CARE, 2014).  
Building resilient communities in Carrefour 
CARE has been working in the area of Carrefour since shortly after the 2010 earthquake. Within 
different neighbourhoods, in a community of 6000 households, CARE have made improvements in 
sanitation, disaster risk reduction, safer construction methods, adequate infrastructure, improved 
income options and improved governance. In order to rebuild the livelihoods a long-term vision and 
innovative approaches have also been developed. The main strategies includes components like job 
creation and income generation. Based on CARE`s numbers, 529 livelihood have received grants for 
returnees in Carrefour accompanied by training in income-generating activities, and 90 families have 
received training and initial materials to start urban gardens in Carrefour (CARE, 2014). 
The CMDRR process 
After the earthquake in 2010, CARE has implemented a neighbourhood-upgrading project in Ti-Sous 
and three other small areas bordering Ti-Sous, covering more than 100 households in Carrefour 
district. In this frame, CARE has started a CMDRR (Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction) 
projects on infrastructure, housing, reconstruction, housing repairs, capacity building and community 
organization. CARE has reported working with the Mayor of Carrefour’s office to support needs 
assessments and coordination activities within this district (DEC, 2011: 7). CARE has also entered into 
a partnership with Cordaid regarding CMDRR initiatives. As elaborated by Julie Razongles, the project 
manager of the Neighbourhood Beautification project at CARE Haiti, “the CMDRR process aims to 
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provide the community with key elements to be able to better understand the risks associated with 
natural disasters and climate change, and/or reduce them. This project also includes the 
implementation of some mitigation measures such as the building of infrastructures in order to 
reduce the identified risks” (Personal interview, 2015). 
Moreover, the CMDRR process consisted of eight workshop focusing on two main activities: 1) 
Education and information sharing and; 2) fiscal training on how to construct safe houses. During the 
CMDRR workshops and training, CARE followed an already planned and developed strategy for all 
four communities.   
Among the expected results of the project were: 1) improved awareness and knowledge of 
vulnerability, risk and disasters; 2) Improved disaster preparation and mitigation and; 3) Improved 
community relations. (The final evaluation of the CMDRR process along with its results as perceived 
both by CARE’s staff and the community members are discussed and analysed in the following 
chapters on findings and analysis). 
5.2 Introducing Project Haiti and its operation in Delmas 33 and in Saint-
Louis-du-Sud 
About Project Haiti 
Project Haiti is a Norwegian non-profit, non-political and non-religious charitable organization that 
was initiated in 2000 by Ingvill Konradsen Ceide, Luc Edwin Ceide and Nina Bønå. The project is 
mainly administered and run by professionals from Norway where the central tasks include 
marketing and fundraising. Project Haiti rely heavily on volunteers and supporters in order to 
maintain operation. 
Project Haiti’s primary goal is to improve the condition for poor children in Haiti, and as such, they 
have established two schools; Petit Troll Port au Prince, in Delmas 33, and one school in Saint-Louis-
du-Sud. The project also organizes summer camps run by volunteer youth from Scandinavia and 
exchange of students and professionals from Norway and Haiti. The school in Port au Prince was 
operational before the earthquake. Despite the damages from the 2010 earthquake, the school was 
one of the buildings left untouched by the earthquake. In order to help the local community, the 
organization implemented a temporary station for emergency relief. In 2012-2013, 300 children were 
attending the two schools. In addition to following the national curriculum, the students also learn 
about such subjects as human rights, environmental issues, health, music and arts (Project Haiti, 
2012c and Project Haiti, 2012d). 
   
 
57 
 Building Resilient Communities through Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes 
As reading and writing is also an essential prerequisite in order to be able to improve the situation 
for oneself and one's family, Project Haiti also offers reading and writing courses to women. This 
program is called Manman Troll, which offers two separate paths of education; “one academic path, 
aimed at women aspiring to master a profession, and one path for the women holding ambitions to 
start small companies on their own”. NORAD has contributed to the financing of Manman Troll since 
2008 as a part of the Norwegian program “Sivilt Samfunn”. This financial support has also been used 
to build the school in Saint-Louis-du-Sud. However, the organization and its project is primarily 
dependent on locally mobilized resources  through donations from organisations and schools in 
Norway as well as through child sponsorship from private donors (Project Haiti, 2012b). One of their 
main challenges is sufficient funding.  
In addition, Project Haiti the organization also provides vaccinations to all of the students and 
information on health related issues in the schools. The organization has a plan to build a health 
clinic in connection with the school and youth club (Project Haiti, 2012a).  
5.3 Introducing PLAN Haiti and its operation in Croix de Bouquets 
About PLAN 
PLAN international is an independent, non-religious, non-political and non-governmental 
organization funded over 75 years ago. It is one of the largest children’s development organizations 
in the world operating in over 51 developing countries and with 86,676 communities across the 
world. Plan's vision is “a world in which all children realise their full potential in societies that respect 
people's rights and dignity” (PLAN, 2015a). In order to achieve their goal, PLANs work is based 
around eight main areas: education, health, water and sanitation, protection, economic security, 
emergencies/disaster relief, child protection and sexual health, including HIV (PLAN, 2015d). 
PLAN in Haiti 
PLAN has been operational in Haiti since 1973 and is an international NGO in Haiti . The organization 
has addresses issues related to extreme povery, violence, maternal mortality, health, education and 
DRR. Their operation has been concentrated within eight main communities: Croix-des-Bouquets, 
Beudet, Frère, Jacmel, Lavallée, Cayes Jacmel, Trou du Nord, Ouanaminthe and Fort-Liberté.  
Since the earthquake, PLAN has raised US$43,500,000 and secured US$13,000,000 in gifts-in-kind to 
help Haitians rebuild their lives (PLAN, 2015b).  
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PLAN in Croix-des-Bouquets 
PLAN’s West Unit program is located 12 km northeast of Port-au-Prince, in an area called Croix-des-
Bouquets.  It was in this area that I participated in the two FGDs. The organization has worked in this 
area since 1976, and managed to sponsor 9,800 children (PLAN, 2015c).  
5.4 UMCOR  
We (Maria and I) also interviewed one person working for the non-profit humanitarian aid 
organisation: The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). UMCOR’s work includes 
programs and projects in disaster response, health, sustainable agriculture, food security, relief 
supplies, and more. UMCOR is mainly working in the earthquake-affected areas in western part of 
Haiti and is planning for longer-term involvement in three primary sectors including WASH-programs 
(water, sanitation and hygiene/health), Livelihoods and shelter and reconstruction. The main 
objective of UMCOR is to support the Government of Haiti in implementing sustainable post-
earthquake reconstruction (UMCOR, 2015). 
The information above is mainly provided through the organizations (CARE Haiti, Project Haiti, PLAN 
Haiti and UMCOR) web pages and information provided in interviews or in reports made by the 
organizations. Although their information seems valid, I have taken into account that the 
organizations might inflate positive findings in order to maintain operation. The information is 
therefore not considered to be objective and needs to be understood as such. 
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Chapter 6 Presentation of empirical findings 
 
In this chapter, the key findings from my fieldwork in Haiti are presented. These findings are based 
on data that was gathered from the 119 respondents, living in Ti-Sous and La Grenade (Carrefour 
district), Delmas 33 and Croix-des-Bouquets, including community members and NGOs staff (CARE, 
PLAN, Project Haiti and UMCOR). Since CARE and the community members living in Ti-Sous and La 
Grenade were the main source of information, this chapter will mainly focus on them. 
My empirical research, as mentioned in Chapter 4, is based on a qualitative methodological 
approach, as I wanted to evaluate how CARE support to the communities in Carrefour district is 
influencing the process and outcome of CMDRR programmes, and if CMDRR is sufficient to build 
resilient communities. My four main research questions will be analysed separately, and different 
propositions will be discussed within these questions, whereas the theory is brought into the analysis 
in chapter seven. 
6.1 Risk and vulnerability in natural disasters 
As suggested in the literature (see for example UN, 1999), understanding vulnerability is crucial for 
devising preventive strategies that will work. Interviews and FGDs held with NGOs staff and 
community members pointed out mainly two explanations for the occurrence of the 2010 
earthquake in Carrefour district. Causes that can be explained scientifically were perceived by most 
of my respondents as the cause to the 2010 earthquake. The explanation advanced by these 
respondents suggested that the geological location was responsible for the earthquake, while human 
activities like deforestation, industry and climate change were responsible for natural disasters in 
general. Many community members explained the earthquake based on their belief system.  
In the next subsection, I will identify the root causes of vulnerability as perceived by my respondents, 
both the community members and CARE. I find it important to include what the CARE staff perceived 
as the root causes of vulnerability, as they are the one that has implemented the CMDRR program. If 
their program is to be successful, they need to understand the vulnerability context in which they 
operate.  
6.1.1 Understanding natural disasters: causes and effects 
 
In this study, all respondents had experienced natural hazards. They understood natural hazards as 
“bad events” and mentioned storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts and earthquakes. Most of my 
respondents from Carrefour district showed an understanding regarding the terms natural hazards 
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and natural disasters, and could separate between them. Their awareness around these terms were 
amongst other a result of an awareness campaign carried out by different INGOs, including Red 
Cross, Bring Change and CARE, after the 2010 earthquake. The community knowledge was limited in 
regards to the earthquake as such, as they had not experienced this before.  
What was the Cause? 
Understanding how people perceive disasters and vulnerability is vital in order to understand the 
nature of local coping strategies, as they will respond to what they believe to be the cause. Based on 
the empirical data collected in this study, the causes behind risks, natural hazards, catastrophes and 
natural disasters were understood and perceived differently amongst my respondents. Several 
factors were identified to influence people’s perception, including the level of knowledge and 
believes.  
Believes 
Some people believed that disasters were an act of God, an event outside human control for which 
no one could foresee or prevent the disaster. This was the case for a few women living in Ti-Sous and 
Delmas 33. They saw the 2010 earthquake as a consequence of humans abusing the earth, and were 
convinced that the earthquake was a direct result of humans misacting. They did not mention any 
other natural hazards. As stated by a woman living in Ti-Sous; “the earthquake was a kind of divine 
retribution as we have disregarded our nature and forests for so long”. She further argued that only 
God could save them from another earthquake.  
This perception was also apparent amongst some women living in Delmas 33. However, the women 
in Delmas 33 recognized that even though the earthquake was an act of God, they could still do 
something to decrease the risks associated with natural hazards. As stated by a woman “praying is 
praying, it can only get you so far. God cannot do anything unless people take actions themselves”.  
Knowledge 
Despite the fact that some women saw natural disasters as an act of God, most of my respondents, 
both men, women and children, viewed natural disasters as caused by natural hazards and other 
risks associated to human activity. The majority argued that natural disasters are a result of human 
activities such as deforestation and industry. However, as previously stated, their knowledge was a 
result of an awareness campaign carried out by INGOs after the 2010 earthquake, and as a result, 
they did not know what to do in the actual event. 
   
 
61 
 Building Resilient Communities through Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes 
In the two neighbourhoods Ti-Sous and La Grenade, most of the people knew the term climate 
change. They knew the difference between human induced climate change and natural climate 
change, although most of my respondents only referred to human induced climate change when 
talking to me. In the focus group meeting in La Grenade (only female respondents), they had learned 
about climate change and its effects from CARE. They all agreed that the climate is and will continue 
to get warmer due to human activities such as CO2 emissions from cars and industries, which will 
increase droughts, hurricanes and rain. A woman also mentioned earthquakes, but she was 
“corrected” by another woman who stated; “Maybe human activities indirectly causes earthquakes, 
but this is not the main cause. It is the geological location that makes us vulnerable to earthquakes”. 
The respondents that did not know about the term “climate change” – its causes and effects- had 
recently moved to the community. 
The children interviewed in Delmas 33 also mentioned that climate change was a real threat to their 
livelihoods. A young girl argued: “Natural disasters and climate change happens because of 
deforestation. We cut down too many trees here. If we cut down a tree, we should replace it by five, 
but we don´t do that”. A boy added that: “We burn too much plastic, polluting our air and there is too 
much rubbish in the streets and oceans”. Our water resources are being blocked by rubbish”.  
All the children living in Delmas 33 were able to see the connection between human activities, 
climate change, increased natural hazards and the disasters that followed. In comparison, the 
children living in the more remote area of Croix-des-Bouquets had never heard about the term 
climate change. I found this to be strange as PLAN founded some of the schools activities.  
What were the effects? 
The most frequently mentioned disasters were floods, storms and the 2010 earthquake. Flooding 
and storms were perceived as a recurrent problem, while all respondents mentioned the 2010 
earthquake as the most devastating natural hazard they had experienced. As the community 
members interviewed experienced that repeated disasters increasingly and severely affected their 
livelihoods, I have also included the effects of storms and floods in addition to the 2010 earthquake. 
This way, we are better able to understand the risks that the community members were facing in 
regards to different natural hazards.  
Floods  
In Carrefour district, where the two (neighbourhood) communities are situated in the hillside, floods 
were perceived as threatening the dwellings and livelihood of the population during the rainy season. 
The increased risks were associated with landslides. As stated by a man working in a Community 
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Based Organization (CBO) focusing on flood prevention in Ti-Sous; We live in vulnerable areas where 
landslides and floods are frequent. The vulnerable location and unsustainable practices makes these 
landslides and floods more severe and devastating. When I asked what sustainable practices he 
meant, the man further stated that it was “because we have a lot of rubbish in the ravines and canals 
and when it rains, the rubbish blocks the water creating landslides and floods. If we continue to 
through rubbish in the streets and in the ravines, our troubles will continue”. 
This unsustainable practice related to rubbish was easy to observe all over Port au Prince. The 
massive canals, which looked like dried up rivers, were filled with garbage. In these canals, it was 
normal to see fat pigs and goats rolling around in decomposed food. (Ref. to picture from Carrefour 
district below). 
 
 
Figure 11: Picture of the unsustainable garbage situation in Carrefour district (Source: Author, fieldwork, 
2015) 
 
Both landslides and floods were causing periodical displacement of people in all of my study areas. 
The effect of a vulnerable environment and an inadequate water draining system were seen as 
casual factors that increased the impacts of floods. When I asked what direct effects flooding had on 
their livelihoods, all of my respondents answered “material damage on their houses and 
infrastructure”. Consequently, many people lost their businesses, which initially served as their main 
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sources of income. In addition, some mentioned that their animals suffered and died, which also 
affected their businesses. Others also mentioned disease outbreaks as results of flood. The landslide 
often caused by flooding destroyed sanitation facilities such as latrines. There was also water 
contamination and some water sources were completely destroyed. According to a CARE official, this 
led to an outbreak of different diseases such as malaria, dysentery, cholera, and diarrhoea. 
Storms 
Storms and hurricanes were also seen as “bad events”, and an overlapping issue to flooding. The 
effects of rain and storms were associated with heavy flooding and strong winds by all of my 
respondents. Many mentioned that heavy storms often destroyed their houses and that it was 
difficult for them to build up their homes again as they lacked the necessary materials to do so. In 
addition, many mentioned that storms happened so often that they did not managed to rebuild their 
homes before a new disaster stroke. However, none of my respondents mentioned anything about 
casualties.  
The 2010 earthquake 
The 2010 earthquake was destructive in all the areas I visited, and all of my respondents were 
affected. As buildings and other structures were poorly built, and the epicentre was near the capital, 
many lost their home and their life or knew people how did. As shared by a woman living in La 
Grenade; “My family lost everything in the earthquake, our home is buried in the rubble and we have 
no resources to rebuild”. Another woman said that; “I lost many friends and family members that 
day. Everyone lost someone”. 
They felt scared when the earthquake happened, as no one knew what to do. As stated by a woman 
living in La Grenade: “We do not have any experience that equals the catastrophe of the earthquake. 
We also did not have any information or forecast about what was coming, so it was impossible to 
help ourselves at the time”. 
The effects of the earthquake were a huge number of casualties and a massive destruction of 
buildings and infrastructure. Because of the destruction of houses, many people were displaced. A 
great number of people were temporarily hosted by relatives and neighbours, or relocated to 
temporary shelters.  During my fieldwork, I learned that some still lived in tents provided by NGOs. 
Other effects mentioned were the loss of small farms and animals, which has had a negative impact 
on their food security and income. Even though it is five years since the earthquake, many still 
suffered the consequences. 
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6.1.2 Different levels of vulnerability 
 
When conducting the interviews it became clear that there existed different levels of vulnerability. 
Based on different discussions and interviews I found out that my respondents separated between 
social vulnerability, political vulnerability, economic vulnerability, and environmental vulnerability.  
Social vulnerability 
Valery Simeon, the one responsible for the implementation of the CMDRR process in Carrefour 
district, referred to social vulnerability as one of the most challenging level. He stated that:  
“Social vulnerability is a condition that affects everyone’s ability to prepare for and recover from an 
extreme event. This is because the government and the structures of society are unable to withstand 
the impacts of hazards. The people also feel socially excluded from the government’s decision. Social 
vulnerability has much to do with the social inequalities that exist within Haiti”. (Personal interview, 
2015) 
In the discussion with Valery Simeon, social vulnerability was also seen as a result of limited 
government control and weak relations between the government and the civil society. He further 
noted that the lack of information, which should have been provided by the government, had made 
the Haitian society ill equipped to prepare and recover from disasters. As he claimed: “The 
government rarely inform its citizens about what to do before a disaster, so when the disaster has 
occurred it is too late. Information sharing has become our jobs” (Personal interview, 2015). The 
community members also acknowledged the weak communication between the government and the 
civil society. As a woman argued: “We know we have a government and we know about the DPC. 
However, they have not been present in these communities before or after the 2010 earthquake”. All 
of my respondents shared the perception that the government had been absent in regards to local 
development and prevention strategies.   
Some of the respondents living in Delmas 33 said, however, that the government had informed them 
about natural disasters through flyers, radio, SMS and television, but that this information only said 
that a disaster was coming.  As a woman living in Delmas 33 argued: The government has informed us 
about some storms and hurricanes, but we need more preventive information, not only information 
about what is going to happen” (FGDs, 2015).  
Valery Simeon also highlighted the problems of urbanization and the fact that a huge proportion of 
the people live in urban slums, where poorly build buildings makes them more vulnerable. Several of 
my respondents also mentioned the aspect of population density and urbanization. A woman living 
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in Delmas said; “One of the main problems in my neighbourhood is how close they build houses. Not 
so long ago there was a fire, and many lost their lives as it was difficult to escape” (FGD, 2015). 
Political vulnerability 
Throughout the discussion, Valery Simeon also argued that the government had been internally 
unstable, both before and after the earthquake. According to him, this had influenced the 
government’s ability to make sound policies that addressed the current needs of its population in 
regards to natural disasters. He highlighted that the country needed policies on building codes and 
information on how to build safer houses.  
I quickly learned that there are almost a complete absence of building codes and regulations. I was 
told that construction companies often used expensive materials such as rebar, the steel bars used to 
reinforce the concrete. However, the concrete itself was cheap; cement mixed with salinized sand. In 
addition, in order to get more money, builder often added more water to the cement mixture.  
The community members also emphasized political instability as a challenge to achieve development. 
All of them viewed the government as to unable to fill its responsibility to its citizens. As addressed 
by a young man participating in the workshop in Ti-Sous; “The biggest obstacle of creating positive 
development and resilient communities is that a leadership is missing. We need both a national 
leadership and a community leadership that we can trust”.  
In effect, the lack of interaction between the government and its citizens has made individuals more 
reluctant to accept or even recognize a common set of rules, or to perform their own duties to the 
rest of the society.  As a man living in Ti-Sous told; “The government makes many rules and laws. 
However, the challenge is to make people listen and following these laws. If someone is breaking a 
law they are not punished”. A woman agreed and added; “The police officers and the government 
officers only act in their own interests and this won’t change anytime soon”. 
Economic vulnerability 
Valery Simeon acknowledged that the government was lacking the financial resources needed to 
implement long-term strategies to decrease human vulnerability. A CARE employee elaborated this 
perception: “People need to understand that rebuilding the country takes time as also the 
government has limited resources” (Personal interview, 2015).  
My respondents referred the lack of economic resources as the main reason as to why they were so 
vulnerable. This challenge was seen in relation to unemployment and underemployment as many 
were struggling to find work. During the CMDRR workshops in Carrefour district, it was evident that 
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the issue of unemployment was a major concern, as the community members did not have a 
sufficient income to provide for their families. Almost all the participants asked the question: “After 
this training will we have a better chance of getting a job”? By training, they were referring to the 
CMDRR workshop. Another woman stated; “The biggest challenge in this community is 
unemployment. We only have small businesses which is hardly enough to sustain ourselves or our 
families.” 
The lack of jobs also meant that the respondents did not have the adequate resources to build better 
houses and infrastructure.  As a man living in Ti-Sous informed: “Our biggest challenge is the lack of 
jobs. Most of us don’t have the money to buy materials to build safer homes nor the time as we need 
to concentrate our efforts on finding or keeping a job”. A woman living in La Grenada also underlined 
the issue regarding limited resources when arguing; “We have seen positive change when it comes to 
awareness around the danger of bad construction and we know more about the building back better 
principle, but lack, however, the money to make change in a big way”.  She further explained that 
they have the ideas on how to make change, but that without the resources to see things through, it 
was hard for them to do anything to decrease the impact of disaster.   
Environmental vulnerability 
When it comes to environmental vulnerability all of my respondents mentioned that Haiti has severe 
problems in regards to deforestation and unsustainable practices related to garbage. They also 
acknowledged that people build houses in unsafe environments. For instance as explained by a 
young women living in La Grenade: “Most of the people living here have built their houses on unsolid 
grounds in the hillside. When it rains, some people end up losing their houses, their animals or even 
worse, their lives.” Another women living in Ti-Sous made a similar statement as she argued: “The 
vulnerable environment and the fact that we don’t know what to do or where to build are the biggest 
challenges. We have poor living conditions, which makes us more prone to disasters”. (See figure 7: 
picture of the houses build in the hillside below). 
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Figure 12: A picture of the housing situation in Carrefour district (Source: Author, fieldwork, 2015) 
 
6.1.3 Different groups of people 
 
Women  
 
Many of my respondents argued that women were more vulnerable during a disaster compared to 
men. Again, most of my respondents exemplified this point by the 2010 earthquake. As claimed by a 
woman living in La Grenade; “Women were more vulnerable in the earthquake because we stayed 
indoors”. Women were also perceived to be more vulnerable as they had less access to resources; 
were victims of gendered division of labour; and were the primary caregivers to children, the elderly 
and disabled. Some also mentioned that women were more sensible and emotional, and that this 
affected the way they behaved after the 2010 earthquake.   
All women interviewed stated that women were more vulnerable than men after the 2010 
earthquake. They felt particularly vulnerable in the camps set up after the earthquake. As stated by a 
woman; “we felt uncomfortable because we didn’t have safe places where we could take showers or 
go to the toilet privately”. The women also argued that the number of rapes increased as a result of 
inadequate security in the camps. Valery Simeon also highlighted women as a vulnerable group in 
our discussions. He argued:  
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“Women are vulnerable when it comes to all dimensions, including social, cultural, political, economic 
and domestic vulnerability. Social and cultural because the women takes care of the family, which 
equally affects their vulnerability… A woman that does not master reading has less power to talk to 
people, to feel included and empowered. If she do not have the money to support her family 
prostitution might occur. When it comes to politics women are not even heard” (Personal interview, 
2015).  
CAREs gender advisor further emphasized that the biggest challenge of being a woman in Haiti is the 
lack of control over own life and body: 
 “Women in Haiti don’t have control over their own lives. They do not control the family economy. 
They lack the education needed to understand the risk associated with natural hazards, and they have 
very little say in the public realm”.  
The gender advisor (Personal interview, 2015) also stressed that family responsibilities made it 
difficult for women to attend school and get an education.  She argued that education is key to 
understand the risk associated with natural hazards and that if women attend school their 
vulnerability to natural hazards will decrease. In the FGDs held with only women, they all stated that 
the earthquake increased their workload. As expressed by one woman participating in the FGD in La 
Grenada; 
“Our responsibility in the household has increased after the earthquake. More things requires out 
attention, time and energy. Food, water and construction materials are more expensive, and we have 
to buy everything ourselves. Things have gotten worse for us and we feel more vulnerable”.  
The representative from UMCOR and Valery Simeon also highlighted that women were facing major 
challenges in terms of sexual exploitation by community leaders after a disaster. They argued that 
community leaders, who often were in charge of distributing essential resources after a disaster, 
where asking women and girls for sexual favours in return for resources or help. In addition, the 
representative from UMCOR claimed that the government representatives also took sexual 
advantage of women, making it hard for women to trust both the community leaders and the 
government. The gender advisor at CARE in a personal interview supported this perception. She also 
mentioned that after the earthquake they (CARE) saw an increase in abortions due to rape and 
sexual favours in camps. As abortions are illegal in Haiti, many women and girls died due to 
complications.  
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Children 
Before and after the 2010 earthquake, all respondents viewed children as a particularly vulnerable 
group. The adults thought children were more vulnerable in disasters since they lacked experience 
and the ability to resist disaster compared to adults. As stated by a women living in La Grenade; 
“Children cannot run as fast as adults and therefore not escape as easily”. She referred to the 
earthquake and said; “When the earthquake happened many children got scared and run into the 
houses to hide”.  
All the INGOs involved in this study also stressed that children were more vulnerable after a disaster. 
As argued by Valery Simeon: 
“After the earthquake, many children lost their parents and found themselves homeless. Without 
anyone to take care of them, they ended up on the streets, vulnerable and alone.  Unfortunately, 
some people took advantage of this, and some children were illegally adopted, forced into labour or 
into prostitution” (Personal interview, 2015).  
The gender advisor also pointed out that girls were more vulnerable as compared to boys, because 
they were more likely to be exploited after a disaster. By exploited she meant sexually abused. She 
mentioned that the displacement camps set up after the earthquake made children more vulnerable. 
One aspect was how children were left alone in their tents when their parents had to pick up food 
and other resources. 
The boys interviewed from Delmas 33 and from Croix-des-Bouquets also claimed that the girls were 
more vulnerable and in danger. The girls, however, claimed they were all equally in danger when a 
disaster occurs. On the other hand, both boys and girls said that girls were more vulnerable after a 
disaster because they can be raped and boys are more violent. The boys also stated that boys were 
naturally stronger than girls, making the boys less vulnerable after a disaster.  
My respondents also mentioned that children’s wellbeing, particularly in terms of health and 
education were affected negatively after the 2010 earthquake. However, the adults underlined that 
these poor conditions existed before the earthquake.  
Other groups  
In addition to the groups above, my respondent also mentioned the elderly and disabled people as 
vulnerable groups. In the case of the earthquake, many lost their life as buildings collapsed and 
elder’s responsiveness was slow. Many also mentioned that after the earthquake many died due to 
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injuries and diseases like cholera. The disabled were also seen as vulnerable in and after a disaster as 
their mobility and reaction-capability were limited.   
6.2 The role of the civil society, the government and NGOs after the 2010 
earthquake 
6.2.1 Response 
 
The responses of community members to the earthquake were largely influenced by the way they 
understood the causes and the extent of effect.   
All community members were in shock immediately after the 2010 earthquake. This had much to do 
with the fact that they were unprepared and inexperienced. Almost all respondents mentioned that 
their number one concern after the quake was to find their families and to make sure that they were 
safe.  The women often took their children to safer locations, while the men started the process of 
locating injured people and excavating dead bodies.   
My respondents were also asked if they received help, and if so what kind of help and from who, 
during and after the earthquake. They all agreed that the government had, to a large extent, been 
absent, before, during and after the 2010 earthquake. My respondents claimed, in this context, that 
they had no access to the political or economic spheres of the Haitian society, and that the state 
apparatus existed only to serve themselves or the private interests of the ruling elite. 
They all stated that INGOs (Action Aid, Save the children, CARE, and Bring Change) gave them 
resources like food and aqua tablets for cleansing the water. These resources were perceived as the 
most important resources given. In addition, they were after some time provided with tents; for 
shelter, flashlights and first aid kits. They all agreed that women received the most resources, and 
explained that the INGOs operating in Carrefour district were aware of women’s needs. An example 
given, was that the food were distributed first to women and children, and that the INGOs made 
different lines; one for men, one for women and sometimes one line for single women with children. 
However, some pointed out that although women received most resources, the men often controlled 
the resources. 
Despite the instant relief given by INGOs, the present of NGOs in Carrefour district have been close 
to none after the earthquake according to my respondents. They all expressed concerns for the 
future, as they did not receive help at the current stage, neither from the government nor from 
NGOs.  
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 6.2.2 Disaster preparedness 
  
Interviews with community members indicated that members from Ti-sous and La Grenada had not 
actively been involved in DRR prior to the earthquake. They all stated that the government had been 
absent after the 2010 earthquake, and that the community members had not received any 
information about preparedness strategies from them.  
When NGOs came to help, community members revealed that their own and influence role was 
remarkably reduced as the operations were taken over by these agencies. As stated by a man living 
in Ti-Sous; “We have so much potential, but the past government always called the NGOs to handle 
disasters. We would like to be prepared to tackle the next disaster ourselves, and maybe be the once 
the government calls to help other communities”.  
They further advanced that it is likely that some agencies assumed that the people did not have the 
needed capacity to participate in the rebuilding process. This was evident in the training the 
community members received from Bring Change and Red Cross, where my respondents felt 
excluded from partaking in decisions concerning their own lives. As stated by a woman from Ti-Sous; 
“All the training we received in the past was wrong. We were not included in the decision-making 
concerning our lives. What is more, we did not agree on their way of teaching. Today, we don’t even 
remember the training we received a few years ago”.” Moreover, the previous training and 
workshops were arranged to include only information about what to do in an emergency, and were 
not focused on strategies that would allow the community at risk to better prepare for future 
disasters.  As of 2015, all of my respondents still felt unsafe and unprepared for a new earthquake.  
6.2.3 Local perception about CARE and other INGOs 
 
It is important to note that my respondents’ perception of INGOs as disaster actors before and after 
the 2010 earthquake were widely contested. Some of the respondents, within both CARE and the 
communities, stated that the community members rarely knew the difference between different 
types of organisations, and therefore did not perceive them differently. Others, however, claimed 
that the community did know the difference, and some claimed that community members had more 
faith in the INGOs compared to local NGOs and CBOs. This was mainly because INGOS were viewed 
as less corrupt. As previously stated, women often faced challenges in terms of sexual exploitation by 
community leaders after a disaster. This aspect was also evident in relation to CBOs and local NGOs 
where community leaders often took advantage of the situation.  
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Most of my respondents saw INGOs as the only actors that could help make a difference. A woman 
living in La Grenada stated; “we trust and need the INGOs. We believe that we will need them for a 
long time, and that they will stay as long as we need them. They are telling people what to do in 
comparison to our government.”  
Many of the women interviewed saw INGOs as a good thing, as they helped keep them safe after a 
disaster. As stated by a women living in Delmas; “The INGO gave me a tent to keep me safe after I 
lost everything in the earthquake. I still live in that tent”. It is also important to note that the 
community members saw the INGOs as being very helpful especially in the immediate disaster of the 
2010 earthquake. 
Most of those who responded negatively to INGOs work and practices were, a bit unexpectedly, 
people that had worked or were currently working for local NGOs, INGOs and male respondents. As 
stated by a local NGO worker; “NGOs does more harm than good, they come in and alter the prices, 
and when they leave we have to pay the price”. A Haitian CARE employee said; “organizations always 
want themselves to be the only ones working in the area and they put up signs everywhere to mark 
their territory. As a Haitian, I sometimes feel sad, even though I work for an international NGO, I 
would like to see this “NGO-ization” of the Haitian society gone” (Personal communication, 2015).  
Edwin Ceide, the director and project coordinator for Project Haiti, also viewed the “NGO-ization” of 
Haiti as negative for the general development in Haiti. He especially referred to INGOs as an 
exploitive force that had neglected to take into account the Haitian context in their development 
plans. He argued: 
 “Most INGOs don’t know anything about Haiti, and they are rarely if ever in the field talking to the 
Haitian people about what they need. The INGOs come here with the answers, even though they have 
never been in Haiti before”. He further stressed; “What we need is foreign investments and a 
partnership between INGOs and the Haitian people. They have the equipment and we have the 
natural resources, so let’s make a deal” (Personal communication, 2015). 
The community members also saw INGOs as exploitive. As stated by a man living in Ti-Sous;  
Many INGOs came after the earthquake, and they are now claiming that there are fighting to rebuild 
Haiti. Now most of them are gone, and those who are left only take advantage of the situation, as 
they need the money. NGO is a business like all others. 
A similar argument made by a man living in La Grenada;” working for a NGOs has become a prestige 
job, were people only care for a high salary. Many viewed NGOs as profit-motivated and saw the 
NGO workers as a part of the elite. They found it difficult to trust people who were rich, and profited 
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on their misery. Many people also felt isolated and excluded from partaking in development 
activities.  
Others were concerned about the overwhelming role played by INGOs in Haiti, and stressed the 
importance of a stronger civil society. As stated by a woman living in Ti-Sous; “in time we need to see 
a bigger role for civil society and local NGOs, and a smaller role for INGOs, but we are not there yet.” 
She also addressed that INGOs in Haiti have worked to undermine the symbiotic nature of the social 
contract between the Haitian state and its citizens.   
It was a clear agreement amongst the community members that the government should play a 
bigger role in development and in DRR programmes. When I asked about the reasons to why the 
government was absent in regards to DRR programs, the initial response from the community 
members was that the government did not care about anyone but themselves. As our discussions 
continued, it was expressed concerns that the government had their own agenda; to only develop 
areas in which they could gain financial support and votes. They referred to Petionville as an area 
where the government supported and responded to citizen needs because people there supported 
them. As my translator (Personal communication, 2015) explained to me; “The government has used 
most of its resources to develop Petionville and to help the elite recover from the earthquake. This is 
visible in the infrastructure”.  
CARE 
CARE staff saw their own role as one of supporting and strengthening local civil society, especially in 
terms of building their capacity to decrease vulnerability and risk. They saw their relationship with 
the communities as one build on trust and partnership.  
When I asked the community members in La Grenada about their relationship with CARE, the initial 
response was that CARE had contributed positively in creating awareness of the risks and 
vulnerabilities that existed in the community and most community members trusted CARE. As our 
discussions continued, it was however made complains that the funding was not sufficient, and that 
they needed more funding in order to implement and continue their activities. 
As a rebuttal to this perception, Valery Simeon stated, “our jobs is only to lead them in the right 
direction with this training. This means that they have to take responsibility for own lives and what 
happens when we leave. The goal is to make independent communities that can take care of 
themselves”. Valery Simeon explained that the biggest challenge when it came to preventive 
activities was to make people understand that they are the agent of change. He said; “Only people 
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can rescue themselves. We can only show them the way with providing information and some 
resources. Currently they rely too much on us (NGOs) to do the job” (Personal interview, 2015). 
However, in the interviews with CARE, they acknowledge that Haiti was still in the emergency stage 
of the DRMC. As stated by a CARE officer; “I don’t see a big shift towards preventive activities in 
Haiti”. Valery Simeon also acknowledged that the CMDRR workshop had its limitation. He stated; “it 
is a difference between a good plan in theory and the implementations of this plan in practice. It is a 
good start, but we can’t do the job alone” (Personal interview, 2015). He implied that the present 
situation had much to do with CAREs limited operational capacity. 
6.3 Achieving the task of risk reduction through CMDRR 
The study on CMDRR in Carrefour district was premised on the four components of the CMDRR 
process as devised by Cordaid (2009). These being: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: 
developing contingency and development plans; 3) Self-organization and; 4) participatory 
monitoring, evaluation and learning system. 
In the succeeding discussion in chapter seven, focus will be laid on how these components were 
applied in the CMDRR process in Carrefour District. I have given a particular emphasize on how the 
community members perceived CAREs operation, and if they were given the opportunity to organize 
themselves in a manner that was best suited to meet their needs. As CMDRR plans and activities 
should be based on traditional knowledge and practices, I also found it essential to examine if local 
knowledge and practices were accounted for throughout this process.  
6.3.1 Cares’ operation in Carrefour District 
 
As previously explained in section 4.2, the people interviewed in La Grenada had gone through the 
CMDRR process, while the community members in Ti-souse were at its initial phase of implementing 
a workshop on CMDRR initiatives. 
The community members in Ti-Sous and La Grenada were both approached by CARE and asked if 
they were interested in participating in a workshop aimed to reduce social vulnerability in disasters 
through information sharing and preventive tools. They all stated that this was a good initiative as 
they were eager to learn more about preventive strategies. As explained by Valery Simeon in a 
personal interview; 
 “We have two different levels of training for this program. The first level is training from CARE, where 
the community members will learn more about vulnerability and risks in disasters. We will also 
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provide some resources aimed at building better houses. The other level focus on peoples own 
responsibility as a group, where they have to make the rest of the community aware of the risks” 
He further stated that everyone that do not know about preventive measures or have been trained 
before could participate in this CMDRR group. He explained that both men and women had the 
opportunity to participate in the CMDRR process. However, he acknowledged that in real life, women 
often had too many responsibilities during the day, and as a result, the majority of participants were 
men (Personal interview, 2015).   
Ti-Sous: Implementing CMDRR 
Before the first CMDRR workshop began, everyone introduced themselves for the rest of the group. 
Valery Simeon stressed the importance of getting to know each other and that community cohesion 
decrease vulnerability. The community members could only call each other by first name, as last 
names created distance. This way, Valery said, would make people more sensitive towards each 
other, and make people help one another if a disaster happened again.   
CARE started the CMDRR workshop by giving out a standard test to measure the level of knowledge. 
The purpose was to make a better orientation of what they knew and what they needed to learn 
more about. (See appendices). After the test, CARE handed out post-it notes where the participants 
could write down their motivation for the training, what they wanted to learn, the desired results 
from the training and general concerns and requests in regards to the CMDRR workshops. 
Most of the community members stated that they wanted to learn how to decrease their 
vulnerabilities, so that they could be more prepared to tackle any future events. By events, they were 
referring to natural hazards in general. Many expressed concern over the lack of jobs in the 
community, and wanted this training to help them get a job. Some of the community members 
expressed concerns regarding the value of the CMDRR workshops implemented by CARE, as they 
claimed that past training programs from other INGOs had not helped them in any way. A woman 
said; “We are so used to people coming to us saying what they want to do for us, but that has never 
worked so far, because they don’t listen to us. Our concern is that won’t work again with this 
workshop”. As previously stated, the community members wanted to be the one that the 
government called in if a new disaster occurred. They wanted to participate more during and after a 
disaster. 
Valery Simeon answered the participant’s questions and concerns. He stated that; “Some disasters 
can be reduced. This depends on the capacity of the community. We can divide the capacity to 
prevent a disaster in two parts. The first part is material capacity and the second part is knowledge 
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capacity. Both part needs to co-exist in order to reduce vulnerability”.  He further said; “This training 
will help you become more aware of the risk within this community. Getting a job depends more on 
your education level and work experience” (statement at workshop on CMDRR, 2015).  
He continued the meeting by explaining different concepts, including: DRR, vulnerability, risk and 
climate change. He also addressed the relationship between disaster and development.  
Valery Simeon also showed a movie that illustrated different examples of natural disasters all over 
the world. He explained; “if people have the knowledge and comes together you won’t need any help 
from NGOs”. He exemplified this by saying; “After the devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean, 
children came together to plant trees, which created buffer zones for future events”. This activity 
reduced their vulnerability” (Statement at workshop on CMDRR, 2015). 
The community members highlighted the fact that it was a difference between Haiti and other 
countries. Valery answered; “we don’t try to compare countries, but rather the emphasis is on what 
we can learn from each other on certain things”. A community member interrupted and said; “we 
don’t have time to build back better or to invest in such activities. We need more jobs and money, 
than we can invest”. More people got involved in the discussion. A man said; “there is no government 
here, so even if we have requests or ideas on different activities, we are not able to change the 
situation”. A woman continued this thread as she said; “the government needs to make public laws 
on how and where we should build houses. As of now, people are building houses in unsafe areas”.  
The community members themselves identified community vulnerability and risk and the workshop 
continued with DRR activities in order to cope and adapt to disaster risk. Activities that was carried 
out was how to build houses by using better construction materials, and they also created a aid 
group that was trained to respond to emergencies. These activities also reflected what the 
community deemed important in order to reduce risks and vulnerabilities in a disaster.  
Throughout the workshop, the community members focused on how CARE could help them. CARE, 
on the other hand, stressed the importance on how the community members could improve their 
own situation by being a part of a group, and taking a more active part in the development as well as 
the decision-making within their communities. 
La Grenada: What have they learned? 
In the FGDs with women, they all agreed that the CMDRR process had been successful, as they now 
possessed the knowledge on what to do before a disaster occurred. In La Grenada, the women had 
been through a vulnerability assessment, i.e. a survey of an area to see what risks are and better 
understand what to be prepared for. They had learned that floods, landslides, storms and 
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earthquakes are imminent within the community, and that they need to be prepared before these 
events took place.  
The construction of infrastructure 
A man expressed his gratitude as CARE had thought him how to build dams in order to decrease 
flooding from the local river. CARE had also provided him with some tools that he had used to 
restore the former roads near his house. This effort was, however, greatly weakened by limited 
resources. The man elaborated that the construction of houses and roads took time, as the 
community members had to buy the materials themselves.   
Securing of belongings  
In the discussion, the community members also said that they now secured their belongings. An 
example given was that they had gathered all their important documents, like school diplomas and 
identification papers, and located them in a waterproof box. They had also made copies of important 
documents in case of a new earthquake. They had also bought some extra supplies like food and 
water, so if they were unable to go to the market, they could sustain themselves for days.  
Information sharing  
The community in La Grenada had also developed a face-to-face network for information 
dissemination to alert people when a natural hazard was coming. As only some community members 
had access to a radio or a television, they were obliged to pass on any information regarding an 
impending disaster. They also had a community house where people could gather to share 
information. The men usually shared information in the evenings during social gatherings, while 
women shared it one the way to the market or church, or when they washed their clothes in the local 
river. Valery Simeon also addressed this aspect and added that women are more patient compared 
to men when it comes to information sharing. In this context, it was said that women often educated 
the wider community, while the men often had different responsibilities attached to physical labour 
like, for instance, construction. Based on these findings, the second level of training was perceived as 
successful.   However, as expressed by a woman; “Unfortunately, there is no early warning system in 
place at a national or local level for earthquakes, so we still feel unprepared and scared”. 
I found it strange that even after the CMDRR process the community had not developed any form for 
early alarms system and that they had not developed an evacuation route. 
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Empowerment through knowledge 
The women interviewed felt more self-confident, as they had received valuable knowledge that 
made them a resource for the rest of the community. The community unity was strong in La 
Grenada, and my respondents saw this as an advantage in tackling future disasters. They also argued 
that the CMDRR workshops had strengthened community ties, both within the community and with 
neighbouring communities. The men interviewed emphasized that the CMDRR had proved to be 
effective in building capacities towards disaster-resistant construction. 
Limitations of the CMDRR process  
Despite some success made in the CMDRR workshops, my respondents all agreed that the CMDRR 
process was not enough to build resilient communities. As claimed by a woman in the FGD; “we have 
the information, but there is no funds to see things through. We as women are a part of the CMDRR 
group here, but without additional resources it is hard to do anything”.  
This statement reflects one of the more important elements expressed by my respondents, namely 
the lack of access to a job and income. Even though the participants in the CMDRR learned how to 
build safer buildings, the resources needed to see the training through were lacking.  
In addition, as the CMDRR workshop did not provide the participants with any income or the 
possibility to get a job, some claimed that the workshop was a waste of time. Most of my 
respondents acknowledged that economic security was one of the most important need of the 
community. It was emphasized that in the absence of public funds from the government and NGOs, 
CMDRR should also include human development issues such as, for instance, employment training. 
CARE also acknowledged that the need for employment activities were strong in Carrefour district.  
6.3.2 Operational capacity  
“Capacity-building” was a major buzzword that always influenced our discussions. The community 
members and CARE staff used the words “capacity” and “capacity-building” extensively, and it was 
consistently mentioned with reference to the organisations (CARE) lacking or needing resources to 
implement and monitoring development programmes and activities, and CARE having a role in terms 
of enhancing community capacity. 
A challenge that emerged throughout the discussions was that “capacity” was used as a catch phrase 
to mean anything from administration staff, buildings, leadership skills, government capacity 
financial management skills, ability to generate resources and jobs, and so on. Through our 
discussions, I attempted to make them break it down to explain exactly what kind of capacity they 
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were referring to. The main types of capacity they focused on can be classified as knowledge 
capacity, material resources, financial resources and the ability to meet people’s needs (INGOs and 
the government). 
Knowledge capacity 
My research revealed that capacity building was an integrated element in CAREs operation in 
Carrefour district, and a main priority in their CMDRR programs. Valery Simeon and the CARE staff 
referred to knowledge capacity as the first essential component in the CMDRR process, where the 
participants learned about risk, natural hazards and natural disasters, vulnerability and climate 
change. As previously stated, many participants felt empowered as they now possessed important 
knowledge that they could share with others after the CMDRR process.  In turn, information sharing 
had improved the relationships with neighbouring communities as well as within the community of 
La Grenada. The values of caring for and taking care of one another was according to CARE 
fundamental values in order to build resilient communities.  
Material resource 
Consistently, the first type of capacity that was mentioned by all the respondents, was that of 
material resources – in terms of material resources they had, resources they lacked, and what they 
thought CARE should provide for them. 
Among this, materials to build better houses were a recurring theme. This had much to do with the 
fact that most of my respondents saw inadequate housing and weak infrastructure as the biggest 
challenge to reduce the impact of future disasters. This perception was held both in relation to 
storms, floods and earthquakes.  
After some discussion, it became clear that CARE and other INGOs had previously supported various 
project aimed at building better houses, but that the community members had not maintained the 
houses built. CARE saw the aspect of maintenance as a problem. As stated by a CARE staff; "it is not 
sufficient to build better houses if people don’t maintain what has been built". He further said; “we 
don’t live in this community, so if the people don’t care about what has been built, why should we?” 
The women also mentioned the lack of other types of material resources, such as computers and 
information materials (TV, radio etc.). They also mentioned equipment needed for various social 
activities such as dancing, painting classes or football. As a woman said; “It would be good to have 
some more social activities in this community for children. If children have more to do after school 
they will not get involved in something bad”. 
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The men interviewed mentioned equipment needed for various livelihood activities such as pig 
farming and agriculture, reflecting that their focus was on economically empowerment rather on 
social empowerment.  
Financial resources  
The aspect related to material resources was also discussed in regards to unemployment and the 
need to have a secure income in order to pay for the equipment needed for livelihood activities. 
CARE and PLAN both mentioned the lack of financial resources as a challenge to implement more 
projects and to monitor old projects. Another challenge pointed out by the CARE staff was that even 
when CARE had agreed to provide financial support for specific activities, the money was often 
disbursed much later than it was planned for. As stated by Valery Simeon; “the main problem is late 
disbursements, which causes delays in projects” (Personal interview, 2015). This was seen as partly 
related to delays from donors, but primarily because of CARE’s own system of limitations; they 
require specific documentation, approval at different levels of the organisational hierarchy, and the 
involvement of the national-level accountant in the CARE office. The constant changing of employees 
was also a challenge mentioned. One CARE staff explained; “There are always new people that we 
have to relate to, both inside this organization and in other organizations. The people who have 
received training is quitting their jobs, which affects the effectiveness of our programs, as we have to 
train new people all the time. Training also cost money”.  
The ability to meet people’s needs  
INGOs 
One aspect pointed out by both CARE and PLAN was the challenge of pre-made plans and outdated 
plans of action in regards to DRR and DRM. As CARE acknowledged; “there is little room for making 
changes to the CMDRR plan, and we cannot adopt to the current realities and needs as we are 
constrained to follow these plans as they are developed”.  
One aspect that seemed important to the community members was to expand the CMDRR to include 
CBOs. Valery Simeon said that this was a good request and that they would try to carry out a training 
program for the CBOs at a later stage.  
Both CARE and PLAN acknowledged that NGOs is not good enough for preventing vulnerabilities.  
The government  
Based on my interviews, FGDs and participation observation in the CMDRR workshop, the 
community members did not believe in the government’s ability to meet their needs. Some of my 
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respondents said that the infrastructure had improved after the earthquake as a result of 
government intervention. However, my respondents said that the government was not involved in 
any preventive activities within these two communities. Even though the government had enacted 
policies and laws on disaster management, often including regulations on DRR and climate change 
adaptation, these policies were according to CARE scarcely implemented due to insufficient budgets 
or because the responsible government staff lacked capacity and knowledge on the subject.  An 
officer from UMCOR argued that corruption within the government body was a problem that 
effected the implementation of project. Even though my respondents held a negative attitude to 
government’s efforts, some of the community members acknowledged that without the help and 
resources provided by the government, the rebuilding phase would fall short.   
6.3.3 Local knowledge  
 
It was acknowledged by all respondents, especially CARE staff, that local knowledge was essential to 
identify local needs. In the FGDs held in Ti-Sous, the community members had clear thoughts on how 
to decrease vulnerability. Although local knowledge existed in regards to preventive activities, 
resource constrains had made it difficult for the community members to start their own projects. 
They felt dependent on INGOs to get started.  As stated by a young woman from Ti-Sous; “we have 
the ideas, but we need help to start, the NGOs or the Government should help us”.” 
The community members had many thoughts on prevention activities that should be done. They 
included waste management, reforestation and construction activities.  
Waste management 
The women in particular were eager for the people in their communities to come together and solve 
some of these issues instead of waiting for NGOs or the Government. Activities like waste 
management were emphasized as important. As stated by a woman living in La Grenada; “Where I 
live there is a channel, where a lot of rubbish pills up, leaving the water to flood. I think that I can talk 
to my neighbours to do something about all that trash, so our houses becomes safer”. They also 
expressed concerns over the burning of waste; “since nobody is picking up the trash, people are burning 
it, releasing huge amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere. This smoke is very toxic for us”.  
Burning of garbage was practiced within both communities, but my respondents acknowledged that 
this was a bad and short-term solution to the problems of waste. Despite this awareness, they 
continued this practice. One of the reasons for this was that this practice was viewed as a fast 
solution to the problem of waste.  Many also stated that they did not have time to be concerned 
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about the waste problem. Others saw the waste as to overwhelming for them to overcome, and 
wanted more action from the government.   
Valery Simeon elaborated that waste management in Haiti had become an environmental concern 
and a serious hazard to nature and human health. He stated that he would include this aspect more in 
the CMDRR workshops, as to make people come together at a local level to address the aspect of 
waste removal (Personal interview, 2015).  
The children from Delmas 33 also emphasized the aspect of waste management. A young girl stated; 
“water resources are being blocked by so much garbage. We need to think about our garbage”. This 
statement generated a discussion amongst the students. Many mentioned that they wanted to 
develop a youth group at their school that concerned waste management and environmental 
practices.  
A CARE staff, previously working with waste management after the 2010 earthquake, saw the problems of 
waste management as one connected to poverty and the situation of unemployment;  
“There has been cases were the people hired to clear up the streets have stretched the work out as 
long as they could in order to keep being paid. Some workers cleared rubble from one area only to 
dump it in another. This way they were guaranteed work for month’s even years. In effect, we used so 
much time cleaning up the streets that little progress were made” (Personal information, 2015).  
Based on this statement, people saw waste management as a secure source to make an income, and 
did little to achieve long-term results. The extent of the problems regarding waste management must 
as such be seen within the wider picture of financial dependency and poverty.  
Reforestation 
All my respondents mentioned deforestation as a big problem in regards to climate change and 
natural disasters. A young man from La Grenada said that they could plant more trees in order to 
reduce climate change.  
The aspect of reforestation was also mentioned in my FGD with children in Croix-des-Bouquets. They 
said that PLAN should have a program so they could learn more about these things (referring to 
climate change and natural disasters). A boy said: “the government should teach us about these 
things, but we don’t believe they will help us, only the organizations can help us”. The boys wanted 
NGOs in the area to have project like reforestation to strengthen the community.  
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Construction 
The restoration of infrastructure and building safer houses were mentioned as the most important 
aspects of building better for the future, and thus to withstand the impacts of a new earthquake. 
That the house foundation must be stronger and that the houses must be build further apart were 
some of the thoughts my respondents shared.  
Local knowledge and expertise was not directly included in the CMDRR programme. CARE did address 
local knowledge in the first workshop, as they wanted to identify community knowledge in regards to 
local awareness and preventive strategies. The community members on their side did not address the 
aspect of promoting local knowledge. Their focus was rather set on what they needed help with, and 
which resources they lacked.  
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Chapter 7 Emerging issues, discussion and analysis  
 
This chapter analyses the key findings previously presented in Chapter 6, focusing on key themes and 
concepts identified in the literature review. I will first address how the community members 
perceived INGOs in general, and CARE in particular, when it comes to rebuilding the two 
communities. Next, the discussion and analysis centres on the CMDRR process implemented by CARE 
and addresses the underlying vulnerabilities as perceived by my respondents. The vulnerability 
context in Carrefour district will be analysed through the PAR model, whilst also taking into account 
the particular historical and political context in Haiti. The CMDRR process will be analysed by applying 
Cordaid’s (2009) four components of DRR: 1) risk assessment and analysis; 2) DRR measures: 
developing contingency and development plans; 3) self-organization; and 4) participatory 
monitoring, evaluation and learning system.  
A theoretical analysis of the empirical findings enables a deeper understanding of the particular case 
in question and the cooperation between CARE and the community members in Carrefour district. It 
also allows us to suggest some analytical generalizations regarding how CMDRR functions in practice 
and provides greater insight into how the CMDRR programmes can strengthen local communities to 
decrease vulnerability and risks.  
7.1 The relationship between CARE and the local communities 
7.1.1 Local perception about other INGOs 
 
The perception of INGOs and local NGOs as actors before and after the 2010 earthquake was widely 
contested amongst my respondents. Some claimed that community members had more faith in the 
INGOs than in local NGOs. This was because INGOS were viewed as less corrupt and exploitive 
towards women. Most of my respondents saw INGOs as the only actors that could help make a 
difference, as the government was considered weak and corrupt. This was especially evident 
amongst the women who claimed that INGOs kept them safe after the 2010 earthquake. This is also 
mentioned in the literature review, where USIP (2010) and Lewis et al (2009) claims that the Haitian 
people have learned to look to INGOs rather than the government for provision of essential services.  
Most of those who responded negatively to INGOs work and practices were people that had worked 
or were currently working for local NGOs, INGOs, and male respondents. As one Haitian CARE 
employee said: “organizations always want themselves to be the only ones working in the area and 
they put up signs everywhere to mark their territory. As a Haitian, I sometimes feel sad, even though I 
work for an international NGO, I would like to see this “NGO-ization” of the Haitian society gone”. 
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His statement supports Lewis (2007) perception, that some INGOs have imposed their own 
development agenda, and as such become self-interested actors at the expense of the people they 
are in theory supporting. This view, if it is correct, is in opposition to the values of the social capital 
concept, which is defined by Putnam as the “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam et 
al, 1993:167). Some community members were also concerned about the overwhelming role played 
by INGOs in Haiti, and stressed the importance of a stronger civil society and a stronger government. 
Luc Edwin Ceide stressed the importance of a partnership where the Haitian population should be 
more in control over decision-making. As such, Luc Edwin Ceide supports Even Michael Edwards 
(2000 in Lewis, 2007:11) perception that few NGOs have developed structures that genuinely 
respond to grassroots demands.  
Many people also felt isolated and excluded from partaking in development activities, and viewed 
INGOs as profit-motivated. They found it difficult to trust people who were rich, and profited on their 
misery. Their perception supports Patrick (2011) and Haver (2011) empirical research; that DRR 
programs after the 2010 earthquake have often fallen short in Haiti as the communities concerned 
were excluded and poorly consulted from partaking in the recovery process, and because outsiders 
with limited local knowledge came in and decided a course of action without understanding the local 
realities and contexts.  
 7.1.2 Local perception about CARE 
 
The previous operations carried out by other INGOs (including Bring Change and Red Cross) in 
Carrefour district were characterized by a lack of trust towards INGOs by the community members as 
they felt excluded. However, when asked about their relationship with CARE, the initial response was 
that CARE had contributed positively in creating awareness of the risks and vulnerabilities that 
existed within the communities. The community members I interviewed showed a general 
acceptance of the opportunities CARE brought with them as they had invested considerable funding 
and resources into strengthening the local capacities. There also seemed to be an agreement that 
CARE had managed to include, rather that exclude, the community member’s needs in the CMDRR 
process. Considering this, it can be argued that CARE responded to the two communities’ needs. 
Moreover, CAREs role in Carrefour district can be seen as one contributing to foster development. In 
some instances, it can be said that the community members were able to influence their own lives 
and development path, which is in line with the capability approach; including both material and 
non-material needs.  It also includes the concept of “functioning”, which indicates the broadening of 
human capacity to achieve things in life through self-actualization and education (Robeyns, 2003 and 
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Nussbaum, 2011: 33–34. It was, however, made complains by the community members that the 
funding from CARE was not sufficient in order to continue their DRR activities after the CMDRR 
workshops. The aspect of limited funding’s explains to some degree the strong criticism carried out 
by amongst other Cunningham (2012) claiming NGOs have not lived up to expectations in providing 
assistance in and after a disaster in Haiti. The lack of financial and material capacity will be further 
analysed and discussed in the next section  
7.2 Achieving the task of risk reduction through CMDRR 
In this study, the PAR model of Wisner et al is used as a simple tool for assessing people’s 
vulnerability to earthquakes. The PAR model distinguishes between three components on the social 
side and one component on the natural side. The three forces on the social side are defined as 
follows: root causes, dynamic pressure and unsafe conditions. The component on the natural side is 
the earthquake itself. I recognize that the generation of vulnerability is not adequately integrated 
with the way in which the earthquake affected people; it is a static model. It exaggerates the 
separation of the earthquake from social processes in order to emphasise the social causation of the 
disaster that followed (Wisner et al, 2003: 90-91). It is a qualitative assessment, which has the 
advantage of identifying areas in need of further focus. The PAR model could give disaster managers 
a framework for understanding vulnerability to disasters and for reducing it. 
7.2.1 Step 1: Risk assessment and analysis 
 
The first step in the CMDRR process carried out by CARE was risk assessment and analysis.  CARE 
acknowledged that vulnerabilities and needs could only be identified through a process of direct 
consultation and dialogue with the communities concerned. As such, CARE supported Wisner et al 
(2003:84) who claims; “it is in the hands of local people that the logic of their situation, the 
phenomenology of their living with risks, forces them to be aware of and to discuss their strengths 
and capacities, as well as their weaknesses and needs”. 
The key factors causing vulnerability after the 2010 earthquake were according to my respondents, 
attached to social vulnerability, political vulnerability, economic vulnerability, and environmental 
vulnerability. These findings accord with the results of the previous studies of amongst other Wisner 
et al (2003:4) who states that the nature of disasters are “complex interactions of the natural and 
human world-encompassing both human, social, economic, political and environmental dimensions”. 
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Root causes 
The economic system and the poverty situation: According to the community members living in 
Carrefour district, the main obstacle for creating resilient communities was the high level of poverty 
and unemployment. As such, the local perception of the root causes to risks and vulnerabilities were 
primarily viewed in connection to livelihood security and occupational activities as they claimed that 
they did not have the adequate resources to decrease their vulnerability. By resources, they were 
mostly referring to financial or material resources. In all of my interviews and FGDs, it was also stated 
that it was difficult for them (community members) to start a community project after the 2010 
earthquake on their own because they were financially incapacitated.  Indeed Wisner et al (2003) 
notes that people who are economically marginal and/or who lack the raw materials needed are 
more likely to stop trusting their own methods for self-protection, and lose confidence in their own 
local knowledge. Based on my observation this was the case in Carrefour district prior to the CMDRR 
process; the community had not developed any form for preparedness strategies.  
Webersik (2012) explains that those at low economic levels tend to have less power over their socio-
political and physical environs compared to the rich. Haiti has the highest levels of poverty in the 
Western Hemisphere and the most unequal distribution of its wealth; one per cent of the population 
controls half of its wealth (Webersik et al, 2010, CIA, 2014, and Hallward, 2007).  
The political system: Many scholars, amongst them, Herard (2011) acknowledges that long-term 
solutions are best led by an effective and an accountable government.  
My respondents recognized the need for a good and trustworthy government at a national level, and 
good leadership at the local level, in order to build resilient communities and to decrease 
vulnerability. However, in this study, the community members expressed concerns regarding an 
ineffective and unaccountable government. Many also claimed that the government was corrupt and 
existed only to serve themselves or the private interests of the ruling elite. Based on the interviews 
and FGDs, it became evident that the community members saw their relationship to the government 
as almost non-existing, and as such, they did not support the government by paying any taxes aimed 
at social projects. The community members were also reluctant to accept or even recognize a 
common set of laws. In the face of a deep divide between the Haitian government and the society, 
corruption, crime, and prostitution had emerged as common alternatives to legal economic activities 
within these communities.  
CARE addressed the fact that Haiti was faced with tackling so many fundamental development issues 
that disaster preparedness simply remained a ”luxury problem” that the government could not 
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afford. They recognized that this had much to do with the political history of corruption and self-
interests.  
The overview of the political situation and history in Chapter 2 illustrates some important elements 
that are of particular relevance to understand the vulnerability context in Carrefour district. First, 
Haiti was forced to pay enormous reparations to France in turn for “lost profits” from the slave trade 
and for diplomatic recognition. The money borrowed, 150 million French francs, was concluded as 
late as 1947 (Flood, 2010). Second, Haiti has endured political instability, frequent regime shifts, and 
chronic challenges in governance since colonial times. The governments have primarily focused on 
ensuring their own allowances, which has led to a lack of faith in the political system among the 
people. This is also compounded by the way in which political leaders have not been held 
accountable for repression and brutalities after dictatorship, especially after the father-son Duvalier 
dictatorship, which left Haiti in heavily external debt and aggravating its situation of 
underdevelopment.  
The weakness of the state apparatus and decades of poor governance has had implications for how 
democracy and accountability were understood by the community members living in Carrefour 
district, and what opportunities they had to hold those in power accountable, and moreover, how 
they have been involved in development. According to my respondents, democracy remained 
dysfunctional; as the majority of the people had very limited access to the political or economic 
spheres of society. As such, they were not able to hold the government accountable, as a real social 
contract between the leaders and the people was non-existent. I will therefore argue that the poor 
perception of the government has created a vicious circle of distrust. Haiti have thus end up in a 
situation that Øyhus characterize as “a great divide” between the state and the civil society (Øyhus, 
2013). I also support Tierney (2006) and DfID (2005) perceptions that no vulnerability exist in 
isolation and that the root causes to Haiti’s vulnerability are connected to development failures at a 
national level.  
Gendered vulnerability: Risk and vulnerability are also differently distributed between different 
categories of people. One aspect addressed by my respondents was how women were more affected 
during and after the 2010 earthquake compared to men due to their more vulnerable situation. 
Women were perceived to be more vulnerable as they had less access to resources and as they were 
victims of a gendered division of labour. They rarely participated in the public arena, as they were 
responsible for household tasks. In turn, family responsibilities made it difficult for women to attend 
schools and to get education. They were also perceived as more vulnerable to forms of violence and 
discrimination, and all my respondents mentioned rape and abuse as core factors of gendered 
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vulnerability after the 2010 earthquake. These findings are in line with Dr. Elaine Enarson’s (2000) 
perception that as women face multiple gender discrimination as they are more exposed to higher 
rates of poverty and violence. 
Dynamic pressure: 
The lack of policies: The issue of DRR concerning the structural safety of buildings is viewed by 
amongst others Heard (2011) and DEC (2011) as vitally important given the seismic risks in Haiti. The 
literature indicates that the 2010 disaster could have been averted had sound construction practices 
been adhered to throughout the region (Heard, 2011). My respondents addressed the lack of sound 
policies on building codes and information on how to build safer houses as urgent in order to 
decrease risks and vulnerability and to build resilient communities. Most of my respondents saw 
weak infrastructure and unsafe buildings as a causal factor as to why the 2010 earthquake claimed so 
many lives. Based on their statements and my observations in the field, I understood their concern, 
for instance that there seemed to be little or no urban planning in the Port au Prince area, and no 
institutions to control settlement development. Without sound policies on how and where to 
construct safer buildings, escaping the current vulnerabilities and preparing for a new earthquake 
seems as an unrealistic quest.  
Rapid urbanization and dynamic pressure: As building resilient communities also involves focusing 
on sustainable livelihoods and natural resource management, the CARE staff and the community 
members also mentioned rapid urbanization and dynamic pressure as important factors to address in 
order to decrease the vulnerability within these communities.  
Unsafe conditions: 
Housing development in vulnerable areas: My respondents acknowledged that in many instances 
people build houses in unsafe environments such as unstable hillsides and slum settlements. They 
underlined that these problems were connected to poverty, as people did not have the materials 
needed to build safer houses, but also a lack of policies on where to build. Their statements supports 
Wisner et al (2003) consideration on how the spatial variety of nature provides different types of 
environmental opportunities and hazards.  In the case of the community members in Carrefour 
district, they could only afford to live in slum settlements in unsafe ravines and unstable hillsides.  
The lack of disaster preparedness: The community members also said that they had not been 
prepared in any way by the government or INGOs for an event like the 2010 earthquake. For most of 
them, the first time they saw INGOs in their locality was after the disaster had stroked. Because of 
the lack of preparedness, the effects of the earthquake were devastating for these communities. It 
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must be noted that there has been carried out awareness campaign by other INGOs after the 2010 
earthquake, but that these programs did not address DRR strategies.  
It is important to highlight that while these vulnerabilities are attached to root causes, dynamic 
pressure and unsafe conditions, I recognize that there is no single component that determines 
people’s vulnerability, nor should these components be addressed in isolation from the range of 
factors and processes that have created the vulnerable situation in Carrefour district.  
These findings regarding the different vulnerabilities imply that vulnerability to natural disasters in 
the case of Carrefour district are a result of various internal and external factors such as physical, 
economic, political and social exposures or predisposition of an individual or a community to natural 
hazards and natural disasters. Attention therefore needs to be given to the political and economic 
determinants of vulnerability: most of the community members were vulnerable because they had 
inadequate livelihoods, which were not resilient in the face of the 2010 earthquake, and they were 
poor. They were poor because they suffered specific relations of exploitation and discrimination 
within the political system, and there were limited occupational activities that made the community 
members feel financial incapacitated. Even though most of the respondents had confidence and 
expressed their own ideas, the financial and material resources to make any real change through for 
example local preparedness activities were limited. I also support Webersik and Klose’s argument 
(2010) that if a country has experienced political instability over time, as Haiti has, the country is 
more prone to natural disasters as this increases vulnerability.  
 
7.2.2 Step 2: Activities 
 
As previously presented in Chapter 3, in order to create a human-centred development, people must 
be given the opportunity to organize themselves in a manner that is best suited for meeting their 
desires and interests. Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach and Martha Nussbaum’s Human 
Development Approach further expand this view, where freedom, engagement, affiliation – the 
ability to engage in social interaction and have the freedom (capabilities) and supportive institutions 
to do so – are seen as essential components of the development of any society (Robeyns, 2003 and 
Nussbaum, 2011:33–34).  
Similarly, Cordaid (2009) emphasize that concrete plans and activities should be based on traditional 
knowledge and activities that have been practised and handed down from generation to generation. 
Although local knowledge existed in regards to preventive activities, resource constrains and the 
weak relationship with the government made it difficult for the community members to start their 
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own projects prior to the CMDRR process. They felt dependent on CARE to get started. As such, CARE 
identified communities’ needs and thought the community members about “best practices”.  
Based on my participatory observation of the CMDRR workshops in Ti-Sous, and my FGDs and 
interviews in La Grenada, I will argue that CARE managed to create a good environment where the 
community members were actively involved in the identification and analysis of the risks and the 
vulnerabilities that existed. Based on the risks and vulnerabilities identified, CARE and the community 
members agreed upon some important preparedness activities, including education and information 
sharing, and physical training on how to construct safer houses and roads. They had also created an 
aid group that was trained to respond to emergencies and they had developed a face-to-face 
network for information dissemination to alert people when a natural hazard was coming. As 
previously mentioned the activities carried out were not only focused on earthquake preparedness, 
but also preparedness activities in regards to other possible natural events such as storms and floods. 
CARE had for example provided information and tools to the community members in order to 
decrease flooding from the local river in Ti-Sous.  
The high focus on including all members of the community has also been highly appreciated by all of 
my respondents. It must however be mentioned that CARE followed a pre-made CMDRR plan where 
there was little room for making changes to the CMDRR process. CARE acknowledged this limitation, 
and viewed resource constrains as a challenge in order to incorporate some of the requests from the 
community members. Based on this, I will argue that the CMDRR program cannot be viewed as a 
bottom-up process because the solutions regarding preparedness measures were generated from 
CARE.  
7.2.3 Step 3: Self- organization 
 
The third step of the CMDRR process was self-organization, which entailed that the community 
jointly implemented the DRR plans and activities. As addressed by Cordaid (2009), the CMDRR 
intervention is supposed to be community owned and managed as this empowers communities in 
their quest to further increase their own resilience. Even though it is the community’s responsibility 
to acquire the resources needed to carry out these DRR activities, the two communities were 
financial dependent on CARE to implement these activities (Cordaid, 2009).  
For that reason, it can be argued that even though CARE engaged in capacity-building efforts to make 
the people more independent of CARE, the community members were not able to resolve issues and 
manage individual and collective tasks without the continued support from CARE. Therefore, while 
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the knowledge capacity generated through the CMDRR process contributed to positive development 
outcomes, the community members were not able to self-organize without the help of CARE.   
7.2.4 Step 4: Participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning 
 
The last step of the CMDRR process focused on participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning. As 
explained by CARE such activities were still being developed, both in La Grenada and in Ti-Sous. 
However, as La Grenada had gone through the CMDRR process, some lessons can be shared. 
Based on the FGDs and interviews in La Grenada, showed that the approach to risk and vulnerability 
communication contributed significantly to developing a "culture of safety". This is a positive 
development outcome, especially the way that the community members have changed their 
attitudes from seeing disasters as mainly an act of God to realise that they had the power to cope 
with disasters themselves. The community members, especially the women, felt more self-confident 
as they had received valuable knowledge that made them a resource for the rest of the community. 
In turn, this knowledge had helped stimulate replicable efforts towards resilience building to the 
wider community in La Grenada as preventive information was shared between individuals. The 
CMDRR workshops had also strengthened community ties, both within the community and with 
neighbouring communities.  
There was thus a clear change in attitude, skills and knowledge among the community members in La 
Grenada on issues related to DRR after the CMDRR workshops. It can then be argued that the 
majority of the community members were resilient in the sense that they possessed awareness 
regarding natural disasters and climate change. In this context, resilience can be viewed as a process 
leading to desired outcomes.  In a way, the community members had managed to “bounce forward” 
after the 2010 earthquake, as the new reality created by the earthquake had generated new 
“learning”, which was facilitated through DRR education and training.  
However, the opportunities brought through the CMDRR process in relation to education and 
capacity building strategies have not been able to contribute to the long-term prosperity as both 
CARE and the community members in La Grenada lacked the financial and material resources to 
make real change. The community members still felt vulnerable after the CMDRR workshops.  
I therefore support Manyena (2009) who recognize that people can possess characteristics that 
makes them both vulnerable and resilient. These findings are important because they imply that 
vulnerability to earthquakes and other natural hazards in the case of Carrefour district are not 
connected to a lack of awareness, but must be seen in the interrelationships of resiliencies (Manyena 
2009).  
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Based on the identification of the numerous vulnerabilities it becomes evident that building resilient 
communities involves something more from simply dealing with preparedness measures through the 
CMDRR process. Consistent with the PAR model, my findings suggests that resilience building is 
about good governance: it is primarily and fundamentally political, with its success depending on 
citizen power, participation and a good relationship between the Haitian population and the 
government. It is, thus, important to overcome the current public-private divide- the civil society on 
one side and the state authorities on the other side- in order to create a state-civil society synergy for 
sustainable development (Evans, 1996 and Øyhus, 2013). Similarly, vulnerability or lack of resilience 
to disasters partly lies in the Haitian history. It is therefore likely that ongoing disaster risks are 
reproduced in Carrefour district in the absence of an accountable government, and without the 
adequate financial and material resources to make real change. Consequently, the CMDRR 
programme implemented by CARE and the community members cannot be viewed as sustainable. 
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Chapter 8 Concluding remarks and reflection 
In relation to my attempt to examine if CARE can strengthen the capacity of Haitians to promote 
resilient communities through CMDRR programmes, and to see if such programmes can generate 
sustainable development, my findings suggest that the conclusion is twofold.  
In terms of human progress, improvements in knowledge capacity and involvement in decision-
making, the community members were able to bounce forward after the CMDRR process in the 
sense that the 2010 earthquake had created opportunities for sustainable development through new 
learning and DRR training. The community members possessed important knowledge in regards to 
natural disasters (storms, floods and earthquakes), disaster-resistant construction, and climate 
change after the CMDRR programme. They were also given some tools aimed at building safer 
houses and roads. Another aspect of human progress was that women in La Grenada felt more 
empowered. Based on these improvements, I have argued that the majority of the community 
members were resilient in that sense that they had increased their awareness and knowledge 
capacity. I have suggested that resilience can be viewed as a process leading to desired outcomes. By 
viewing disaster resilience as a process in this case study, I have recognized the human role in 
disasters and the process in which the community members were driven by the CMDRR programme 
outcomes. Viewing resilience as an outcome may be necessary where radical change has been made 
(Manyena 2009).  
In terms of sustainable development, the opportunities brought through the CMDRR process in 
relation to capacity-building strategies had not been able to contribute to the long-term prosperity as 
both CARE, and the community members in La Grenada lacked the financial and material resources 
to make real change. The underlying vulnerability attached to root causes, dynamic pressure and 
unsafe conditions had attributed to the shortcomings of the CMDRR process. These findings provide 
confirmatory evidence that people can possess characteristics that makes them both vulnerable and 
resilient.  
In this case study, the main social factors that contributed to Carrefour’s high susceptibility to the 
2010 earthquake were: 
 Poverty and unemployment  
 Inequality  
 An ineffective and unaccountable government 
 A deep divide between the Haitian government and the society 
 Poor construction and the lack of planning and building regulations and policies  
 Lack of awareness that earthquakes are a significant threat 
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Despite a higher level of awareness that earthquakes are a significant threat, the remaining factors 
were still present five years after the 2010 earthquake, and after the CMDRR process.  
Poverty and unemployment largely determined the way in which the 2010 earthquake turned into a 
disaster. The devastating effects from the earthquake were mostly attached to unsafe construction 
and the lack of information. Poverty was not only perceived as a challenge to be able to cope with 
natural hazards, but also made the residents in Carrefour district less confidence in their own abilities 
to create preparedness activities to withstand future hazard impacts. Even if they had confidence, 
inadequate resources made it difficult to turn ideas into actions. It is therefore critical that natural 
disasters be seen through the lens of reducing risk of and building resilience to disasters. In the 
future, CMDRR interventions in Haiti should recognizes the importance of building seismic resistant 
homes. The issues surrounding reconstruction do not just involve how to rebuild, but also where to 
rebuild (Herard, 2011). In order to eliminate the use of hazardous areas such as the steep hillsides of 
Carrefour district, no-build zones must be clearly outlined and strictly enforced. Specific targets 
should also be related to other relevant development objectives such as education, livelihood 
security and occupational activities.  
These strategies have to be primarily lead by the Haitian Government. Consistent with the PAR 
model, my findings suggests that resilience building is about good governance: it is primarily and 
fundamentally political, with its success depending on citizen power, participation and a good 
relationship between the Haitian population and the government. 
Drawing upon the mixture of my own observations and the theoretical and empirical materials, it 
became evident that INGOs have in some instances had a negative effect on the state-society 
relationships, even if this was not attentional. Both the government and the civil society in Carrefour 
district have had little to say in how to use the funds, and the allocation made by INGOs had not 
necessarily corresponded to Haiti’s needs or priorities. My findings suggested that there was a 
significant disconnection between INGOs, the government and the two communities both in regards 
to the response following the 2010 earthquake, and in regards to disaster preparedness activities 
after the 2010 earthquake. Although it is viewed unlikely in the present situation, what is needed is a 
nationwide dialogue and a commitment from both the state and the Haitian society to a common 
project concerning DRR in which they themselves are recognised. I also acknowledge that a joint 
effort and a strong partnership between the government, the INGOs and the Haitian civil society are 
needed to build resilience at a sufficient scale to make a difference.  
As a concluding remark, Haiti might be one of the best examples in recent history that illustrates why 
natural disasters must be viewed as a substantive threat to both sustainable development and 
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poverty-reduction initiatives. Natural disasters are a development issue because development 
planning can make a difference to lessen the impact that disaster has on poverty, growth and 
welfare. If sustainable development are to be generated, disaster research and disaster managers 
should account for the connections in society that cause vulnerability, as well as for the hazards 
themselves. CMDRR interventions can be one of the sources of DRR information through which 
communities can learn by doing. These interventions are processes that enhance resilience for both 
an individual, groups and communities to deal with hazard events. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Interview guide: used in personal interviews and FGDs. 
 Specific Research Question: 
 What are the root causes of people’s vulnerability within the two 
neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous and La Grenade in Carrefour district, as 
perceived by the community members and the CARE staff before and after 
the 2010 earthquake? 
 What types of community knowledge and local structures existed in 
regard to disaster preparedness in these two communities prior to CARE’s 
operation?  
 
Vulnerability and Risk 
 Identifying and highlighting the root causes of peoples vulnerability (social, cultural, political 
and/or economical?) within these three communities. 
 Identifying the community member’s knowledge of natural disasters and the concept of 
vulnerability and CMDRR. 
 Identifying the authority that promotes CMDRR programs within these communities. 
 
Questions: 
- What happened to you and your family on the 10th of January 2010? Impact of earthquake? 
- Did you receive any help during the first day, week and month? If yes, from whom? 
(government, national organisations and/or international organizations) 
- What resources were made available to you and who provided these resources? 
- What resources was most important for you? 
- Do women and men in this community have equal access to resources according to you? In 
addition, have the access to resources changed after the earthquake? 
- How has the 2010 earthquake affected your life when it comes to family relations and 
household? (Is it the same, or do you have different chores, responsibilities etc.) 
- Are you more vulnerable today as compared to before the earthquake. If yes, in what way? 
- What do you think can or should be done in order to decrease vulnerability in you 
community? And who should be in charge? 
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- Have the local government, or any organisations, prepared you for a new disaster? 
- What do you believe are the most important factors/means in order to reduce the effects of 
future disasters?  
- Do you believe people are aware of the risk that exists in this community? 
 
CMDRR programs, Dependency and Accountability 
 Specific Research questions:  
 How has CARE, responsible for preparing the CMDRR programme and training, 
addressed the needs of the community members and what processes of 
empowerment is traceable to the local participation in the CMDRR programme 
after the 2010 earthquake? 
 How does the people living in the two neighbourhoods: Ti-Sous and La Grenade, in 
Carrefour district, perceive INGOs in general, and CARE in particular, when it 
comes to rebuilding the two communities? 
 
Participation in CMDRR. The community members perception about the operation of CARE and 
INGOs. 
 Identifying people’s perception about INGOs effort in DRR and in development. 
 Identifying people’s perception about CARE’s effort in CMDRR and in development 
 Identify the level of participation in the CMDRR process  
 
Questions: 
- Are you familiar with the term DRR? (if not explain it/ use different words) 
- Do you participate in any DRR activities?  
 If yes: 
- How did you become a participant of the DDR program?  
- Any requirements in becoming a participant?  
- If yes: Does the requirements differ between men and women form your perspective? 
 
- How many community associations does your community have, and can you say something 
about these associations? 
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- What activities have been carried out after the earthquake, and who initiated these 
activities? 
- Do you feel that both women and men are included in such programs? If yes, in what way? 
- Does the organisation you are with collaborate with the local government in regards to DRR 
programs? 
- What do you regard as the most important obstacles in the participation of DRR programs? 
- How could this challenge be overcome?  
 
- Do you think DRR can bring opportunities/ positive outcomes, if so in what way? 
 
 If no: 
- Are you aware of any local organization or institution that promotes DRR activities or people 
who are engaged in such activities?  
- Have the government promoted any DRR activities within this community? 
- Do you think DRR can bring opportunities/ positive outcomes, if so in what way? 
 
Dependency towards NGOs 
- What is the organizations role in promoting DRR programs in your community? 
- Do you feel like you culture have change after the NGOs have been here? If yes, in what 
way? 
- Is NGOs seen as important players in the process of decreasing vulnerability in your 
community? If yes: Do you feel that the they includes community interests when initiating 
DRR programs? Do you feel that your interests and needs are considered? 
- Do you trust NGOs? 
- Do you feel dependent on NGOs to sustain your life? If yes, how can you decrease this 
dependency? In addition, how can the NGO decrease this dependency? 
 
Appendix 2: The INGOs and local NGOs (CARE Haiti, Project Haiti and PLAN Haiti) 
 Specific research question: 
 How has CARE, responsible for preparing the CMDRR programme and training, addressed 
the needs of the community members and what processes of empowerment is traceable 
to the local participation in the CMDRR programme after the 2010 earthquake 
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Questions: 
- How many people live in the community (La Grenada and Ti-Sous)? 
- Do you (the organization) promote DRR programs within this community? 
 
The 2010 earthquake 
- Was the organizations intervention after the 2010 earthquake timely (i.e., how soon after 
earthquake did activities begin) and who was in charge? 
- What needs were identified after the 2010 earthquake. Did these needs differ between 
sexes?  
- Were available resources adequate to meet the communities need after the earthquake?  If 
so, how do they know that the needs were meet (communication)? 
- Do you feel like the knowledge and experience of the staff was and is adequate to meet 
community needs? 
- Was it a partnerships- between the organization and the community members- employed in 
the response? Were new partnerships formed or existing ones strengthened after the 
earthquake? 
 
DRR and community inclusion 
- How do you select a focus area for the implementation of DRR programs? 
- Has there been any allegations from other communities regarding favouritism?  
- What are the main activities carried out by you organization in regards of DRR programs in 
this community? 
- Do you think that these programs holds short-term solutions or sustainable solutions? 
- Do you feel like there exist a mutual relationship between the organization and the people 
you work for (community members)? Describe the relationship. 
- Do you think the community members are dependent on you to sustain a decent life? If yes, 
what should the organization do in order to decrease this dependency? 
- How is local capacities identified and included in DRR programs today? 
- What role does the community members play in local DRR activities? 
- What key lessons can be taken forward to ensure that you (the organization promotes local 
capacities, including women, in building the community to resist a new disaster? 
- What are the main barriers (social, political and economic) of vulnerability facing people 
within this community, according to you? 
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- What are the main management challenges facing this organization in regards to DRR 
programs? 
 
Appendix 3: Questionnaire used by CARE Haiti before and after the CMDRR 
workshop  
- Give an example of risk in this community. How would this risk affect your community to 
cope with natural disasters? 
- How does a catastrophic event affect development? 
- If an authority announces a hurricane, how would you assist your household and/or 
community? 
- Do you know the meaning of DRR? 
- What do you know about risk and disasters? 
- What does a catastrophic event mean for you? 
- Do you know the term vulnerability? 
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